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INSIDER TRADING AND FAMILY VALUES
JUDITH G. GREENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past eighteen years, since the Supreme Court's decision
in Chiarella v. United States,1 lawyers, securities traders, and
commentators have been uncertain as to the reach of section 10b of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 A number of cases, read
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University of Wisconsin Law School, 1972; B.A. Cornell University, 1969. This article is
dedicated to the memory of my late colleague and friend, Mary Joe Frug, who explored
unlikely places for the effects of gender. In addition, I would like to thank Russell Engler,
Theresa Gabaldon, Terri O'Neill, and Elizabeth Spahn for helpful comments; Sandra Sells,
Liz Marcus, and Michelle Caprini-Slayton for research assistance; and, my family for their
support in all ways.
1. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). The statute reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Id.
Pursuant to the powers given it by this statute, the Securities and Exchange Commission
adopted Rule 10b-5 which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
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together, appear to call for a narrow interpretation of the section.
This narrowing impulse could be said to begin with Chiarella in
which the Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the
insider trading rules because the information used in the trade in
that case was not obtained in breach of a duty owed to the firm
whose shares were traded. 3 Subsequently, in Dirks v. SEC,4 the
Court found no violation on the part of an analyst who passed
information of a large-scale fraud to his clients without the intent
to obtain personal gain from relaying the information. Both of
these cases, simply by finding no violation of the insider trading
rules, indicate areas to which section 10b does not apply. Taken
together, Chiarella and Dirks appear to require a close connection
between the source of the information and the firm whose shares
were traded, as well as a breach of a fiduciary duty, motivated by
personal gain, to the source of the information. These two decisions
limited the coverage of section 10b and made it more difficult for
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to prosecute people
who learned of an impending takeover bid from their employer, the
bidder, and then used that information to trade in shares of the
target.5 In an era of mergers and hostile tender offers, this was a
significant restriction on the power of the SEC.6
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
. 3. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court refused to rule on
whether the misappropriation theory was authorized by statute because the theory had not
been presented to the jury that convicted Vincent Chiarella. See id. at 236. Chief Justice
Burger, in his dissent, argued in favor of adoption of the misappropriation theory. See id.
at 239 (Burger, J., dissenting). Three other Justices also indicated their sympathy for the
theory. See id. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., and Marshall,
J., dissenting).
4. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
5. Indeed, the SEC adopted Rule 14e-3 to deal with exactly this situation. This rule was
challenged and upheld in United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
6. The Supreme Court's other insider trading decisions over the past 20 years have, in
general, reinforced the impression that it was narrowing the scope of section 10b. In Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that censure was required under
section 10b, even for private actions. This eliminated the possibility of bringing actions
against firms that had been merely negligent, including those that had negligently monitored
the offending firm. One year after Ernst & Ernst, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977), the Court held that the insider trading prohibition applied only to deceptive
breaches of fiduciary duty, not to all breaches of such duties. Finally, in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), the Court held that a private
plaintiff could not maintain a suit for aiding and abetting under section 10b. Although these
are not the only Supreme Court cases relating to insider trading in the past two decades,
they certainly could be read to indicate that the Court would be hostile to any significant
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In contrast, the Circuit Courts, led by the Second Circuit, devel-
oped a line of misappropriation cases that expanded the coverage
of section 10b.7 These cases held that one who traded on nonpublic
information in breach of a duty owed to the source of that informa-
tion was guilty of insider trading.8 This represented a dramatic ex-
pansion of the traditional view of insider trading articulated in
Chiarella.9 The misappropriation theory made it possible to pro-
secute employees like Chiarella who took information from their
employers and traded in the shares of another firm.'" From its
adoption in 1981 by the Second Circuit, until the Fourth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Bryan" in 1995, no circuit court had re-
jected the misappropriation theory.'2 Bryan was followed quickly
by the Eighth Circuit's similar position in United States v.
O'Hagan." These two decisions raised questions about the viability
of the misappropriation theory - questions that were set to rest by
the Supreme Court's recent reversal of the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. O'Hagan.4
The Court's decision in O'Hagan resolved the question of whe-
ther section 10b encompasses the misappropriation theory of in-
sider trading. It does.' 5 The decision did not resolve the larger
questions as to just how broadly either the misappropriation theory
or the traditional theory of insider trading could be applied. These
questions remain unanswered. O'Hagan defined the misappropria-
tion theory as prohibiting "a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use
of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach
expansion in the reach of section 10b. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988);
Eichler v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
7. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d
197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993). See also SEC v.
Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd., 898 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1990).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 1004 (1992).
9. See Shelene Clark, SEC Enforcement: SEC Enforcement Efforts Seen Hinging on
Result in Misappropriation Theory Case, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 386 (1997) (noting that
currently, half of the SEC's insider trading prosecutions are based on the misappropriation
theory).
10. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (enjoining employee of financial
printer, like Chiarella, from trading on information obtained from his employer).
11. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
12. See SEC v. Cherf, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991) (adopting misappropriation theory);
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting misappropriation theory); Rothberg v.
Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987) (finding liability
based on the misapprorpiation theory without explicitly mentioning the theory).
13. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
14. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997). Hereinafter, all references to O'Hagan are to the Supreme
Court decision.
15. See id. at 2205.
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of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality.... 1  Does that mean that
in misappropriation cases only those who have historically been
recognized as "fiduciaries" of the firm which is the source of the
information will be prohibited from engaging in insider trading?
This would include directors, officers, and some employees of the
business. O'Hagan need not be read as extending beyond this since
James O'Hagan was a lawyer at the law firm from which he took
the information. The term "fiduciary" could also easily include
trustees of a trust or executors of an estate. But would a psychia-
trist who traded on information obtained from a patient be guilty
of insider trading under O'Hagan?" Does this fit within the Court's
idea of a fiduciary? Would there be insider trading under O'Hagan
if a husband traded on information derived from his wife in direct
violation of a promise of secrecy given to the wife?18 Are the insider
trading rules violated if the information comes from the trader's
father instead of his wife? 9
These fundamental questions remain to be decided even after
O'Hagan. The crucial issue is who can violate the insider trading
rules and through what activities? O'Hagan refers to "fiduciar[ies]"
and a "breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality."20 Chiarella,
on the other hand, refers to a "fiduciary or other similar relation of
trust and confidence.... " What exactly does this language mean?
O'Hagan did not clarify this issue, nor do the commonly invoked
explanatory paradigms for corporate and securities law - law and
economics, and fairness. Law and economics commentators origin-
ally advocated the complete elimination of the prohibition on in-
sider trading on the grounds that increased trading would improve
the efficiency of the market.22 Naturally, supporters of this position
made no effort to examine the breadth of particular insider trading
rules since they claimed the whole structure was illegitimate. This
discussion set the agenda for more recent law and economics
commentators who have continued to argue over whether the
16. Id. at 2207.
17. See United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (involving psychiatrist
who traded on information obtained from patient).
18. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
1004 (1992) (involving a husband who trades on information derived from wife).
19. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), reu'd on other grounds, 773
F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
20. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
21. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). Elsewhere, the Court said, "A duty
arises from the relationship between parties." Id. at 231 n. 14.
22. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text (discussing Henry Manne's work).
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prohibition is justified and, if so, under what circumstances. 23 Even
this later generation of law and economics commentators focuses
very little on the interpretation of the existing rules constructing
the insider trading prohibition.24
In contrast to the law and economics commentators, there are
others who reject efficiency as the appropriate structuring factor
behind securities policy and, instead, advocate that insider trading
law should emphasize fairness (often defined as equal access to
information).25 Some of these commentators broadly defend the
prohibition on insider trading, calling for the SEC to further define
its parameters, but not attempting to account for specific rules.26
Others invoke particular ideas of fairness to justify and limit the
insider trading rules.27 Unfortunately, however, this is exactly the
position that the Supreme Court rejected in its decisions in Dirks
and Chiarella.28
This article proposes- another way of understanding the
detailed contours of insider trading law. It is my contention that
the lines the courts have drawn, defining which types of relation-
23. See Dennis S. Corgill, Insider Trading, Price Signals, and Noisy Information, 71 IND.
L.J. 355 (1996) (agreeing that generally insiders should be allowed to trade, but proposing
specific and limited regulatory intervention); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading
as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that insider trading regulations
should be tailored in a manner consistent with market liquidity); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
H. Kraakman, The Mechinisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (recommend.
ing that insiders be required to disclose certain information before trading); Mark Mock,
Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Inside Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
297 (1994) (defending insider trading prohibition as efficient); Lynn A. Stout, The Un-
importance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) (demonstrating that securities markets are not
efficient and that pursuit of the goal of efficiency is likely to bring little economic benefit).
See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995)
(proposing a heterogeneous expectations model for describing market activity instead of the
efficient capital market hypothesis).
24. Even when they propose new rules, these commentators tend to focus on the market
characteristics of liquidity or informational availability, not on who is an insider under the
courts' various formulations of the rules. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23;
Georgakopoulos, supra note 23.
25. See Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and
Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979)
(recognizing that disclosure is essential to investors' faith that the markets are fair); Kim
Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading, " 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 123 (1993) (equating equal access to information with fairness).
26. See Schotland, supra note 25.
27. See Brudney, supra note 25 (arguing for a rule that precludes exploitation of
unerodable informational advantages); Scheppele, supra, note 25 (arguing for a Rawlsian
conception of fairness as a basis for testing the rules).
28. See infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella and Dirks).
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ships violate the insider trading rules, are influenced by the courts'
conceptions of gender roles, and the closely related realms of
market and family. This is not a claim that the courts are con-
sciously discussing gender when they discuss insider trading but,
rather, that gender is one of the concepts that structures the ways
we think about other, seemingly unrelated, issues. Furthermore,
this is not a claim that efficiency and fairness are irrelevant to
insider trading law. Indeed, one of my points is that they too
assume gendered meanings in the context of insider trading law.
It is my claim that ideas about gender, through their connection to
the concepts of market and family, play a part in forming insider
trading law. Insider trading law is understood to be law of and for
the market, but not the family. Thus, concepts of "family" work to
determine the limits of insider trading law.
This should not be surprising. After all, our thinking is
structured by many basic dichotomous pairs,2 and man and woman
are two of the important structuring ideas in our culture.3 ° We use
these categories as ways of thinking about ourselves and others, as
well as about abstractions. Before turning to how ideas about men
and women, and market and family, structure the law of insider
trading, I want to show how they work in other areas. One place
where these ideas are crucial in determining our beliefs is in our
perceptions of the world. For example, Mary Joe Frug began an
essay on sexual equality and difference with the following anecdote
of a woman watching a male friend shop for a suit:
Although the man chose a suit which was too short in the arms,
too long in the legs, and too tight in the pants, he looked at his
reflection in the mirror and said with cheerful confidence, "This
looks great. Send for the tailor." The woman reported realizing
that if she had been in his position she would have looked at
29. See generally CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND (1966); Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209, 211-21 (1979) (describing
opposing structural categories of freedom and coercion); Al Katz, Studies in Boundary
Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 383-85 (1979)
(investigating the resolution of situations involving binary oppositions); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188-90 (1995) (describing a
cognitive approach to categories).
30. See MARGARET MEAD, SEX AND TEMPERAMENT IN THREE PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES (1935);
JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM 45-52 (1974) (describing the importance
to Freud's work of the categories male and female); TORIL MOI, SEXUAL/TEXTUAL POLITICS
(1985) (discussing the importance of the male/female dichotomy in literary criticism); MARY
JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 111-24 (1992) (showing how ideas of male and
female structure impossibility doctrine in contract law).
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herself in the mirror and said, 'This looks terrible. My arms are
too long, my legs are too short and my rear is too fat."
31
In this story, she described the way in which our ideas of ourselves
as men or women play a role in creating who we are. Sometimes
our identities conform to the gender norms and sometimes they are
formed in resistance to them. Either way, without these two
categories, we would see ourselves, and the world, differently from
how we currently do.3 2
Gender categories also affect how we think about subjects that
are less obviously gendered than ourselves. A brief look at some of
these subjects may help us to see how gender functions as a
structuring concept in the area of insider trading law. We tend to
associate subjects that are rational, active, powerful, independent,
or principled with men, and subjects that are emotional, passive,
weak, or personalized with women.33 Several different scholars
have shown how our understanding of science, a subject that we
might otherwise not see as influenced by ideas about gender, is
indeed so influenced. Emily Martin's work demonstrates how
gender categories affect our empirical observations of the reproduc-
tive system.34 The human reproductive system has traditionally
been viewed as involving innumerable active, strong sperm and one
passive, but receptive, egg. The model for fertilization has been one
in which the sperm "swim" toward the egg, and, ultimately,
penetrate the egg and "activate [its] developmental program."3' The
egg simply receives it. When described in these terms, we can see
the way in which the male's sperm is associated with typical male
characteristics of action, power, and independence, while the
31. FRUG, supra note 30, at 3.
32. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 2 (1990) (describing how linguistic systems
come to "produce" the subjects they claim to describe). See also 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Right
of Death and Power over Life, in HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 133 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
33. See FRANCES OLSEN, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 453 (David Kairys ed.,
rev. ed. 1990). See also GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE 3 (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo
eds., 1989) (tracing the dualisms back to the Cartesian framework of knowledge).
34. See Emily Martin, The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance
Based on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles, in FEMINISM AND SCIENCE 103 (Evelyn Fox Keller
& Helen E. Longino eds., 1996). See also Patricia Y. Miller & Martha R. Fowlkes, Social and
Behavioral Constructions of Female Sexuality, in SEX AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 147 (Sandra
Harding & Jean F. O'Barr eds., 1987) (showing that studies of sexual behavior have been
influenced by culturally prescribed understandings of men and women); Elizabeth Spahn &
Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in Science, Religion, and Law,
32 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (1998) (surveying numerous descriptions of sperms and eggs and
showing the influence of ideas about gender).
35. Martin, supra note 34, at 106.
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woman's egg has the traits normally connected with women such as
passivity, weakness, and dependence.3 6
Similarly, theories from biological evolution also bear the
marks of gender ideology. They tend to tie female sexuality to
reproduction, never admitting the possibility that women's
sexuality might operate autonomously from men's.37 Autonomy,
after all, is one of those characteristics associated with men, not
women. In short, even scientific processes cannot be understood
outside of the categories which we use for making sense of the
world.38 While the workings of the body may appear completely
natural, they, like the rest of the world, require interpretation.39
The advantage of a gender-conscious analysis is that it can
illuminate issues or gaps that otherwise are hidden beneath the
"naturalness" of our thoughts about gender. We think it is normal
that sperm, the male reproductive product, should be the active
force because we associate action and aggressiveness with men.
Thus, this interpretation is unlikely to be questioned. This article
undertakes a gender-conscious analysis of insider trading law. A
36. More recently, however, researchers have discovered that the forward force of the
sperm is really very weak - that it could not penetrate the egg by virtue of this force.
Instead, the egg produces chemicals that cause the sperm to stick to it. Clearly the paradigm
had to be revised. Nevertheless, according to Martin, the effect of male and female imagery
in interpreting the scientific data remained strong. See Martin, supra note 34, at 108-09.
The new researchers described the sperm as shooting out and harpooning the egg. In short,
the sperm, associated with men, remained active, powerful, and aggressive.
37. See Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Pre-Theoretical Assumptions in Evolutionary Explanations
of Female Sexuality, in FEMINISM AND SCIENCE, supra note 34, at 92 (describing biologists'
assumption that female orgasm is dependent on intercourse with men).
38. See Susan R. Bordo, The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity: A Feminist
Appropriation of Focault, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLDEGE, supra note 33, at 13 (showing the
body as a product of culture); SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 82-110
(1986) (demonstrating the influence of thinking through dichotomized categories on studies
of the evolutionary process). For further examples of the effect of thinking in dichotomized,
gender-identified categories on science, see also Helen Longino & Ruth Doell, Body, Bias,
and Behavior: A Comparative Analysis of Reasoning in Two Areas of Biological Science, in
SEX AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, supra note 34, at 175-86 (detailing endocrinological studies of
sex differences); RUTH BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGY AND ITS
THEORIES ON WOMEN 80-109 (1984) (criticizing the effort to derive "gender-related" conduct
from the effects of sex hormones).
The categories that science uses for classifying different species are also gendered. The
category "mammal" includes those higher animals with breasts. Thus, women's specific
attributes are used to connect us to the animal world. In contrast, the term homo sapiens
separates us from the animals. It means "wise man." See Anne Fausto-Sterling, Book
Review, 21 SIGNS 172, 173 (1995) (reviewing LONDA SCHIEBINGER, NATURE'S BODY: GENDER
IN THE MAKING OF MODERN SCIENCE (1993)).
39. See FRUG, supra note 30, at 128-29. The effort to create a feminist discourse by
interpreting the female body is at the core of "French Feminism." See generally FRENCH
FEMINIST THOUGHT (Toril Moi ed., 1987); NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS (Elaine Marks & Isabelle
de Courtivron eds., 1980).
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focus on gender illuminates the otherwise unrecognized boundaries
that limit the extent of insider trading law: it does not extend
beyond the male-identified market into the women's realm of
family. In addition, a gender conscious perspective unmasks the
emphasis on breaches of fiduciary duties as being merely a device
to deflect attention from the tension between two important values
connected to the market: equality and efficiency. Finally, a gender
conscious analysis allows us to predict that courts will favor
interpretations of insider trading law that are consistent with the
image of the ideal market as well as outcomes that privilege
concepts that are identified with male characteristics. Thus, a
gender-conscious analysis helps us to understand aspects of insider
trading law that have previously remained hidden from view as
part of the natural order of things.
Part Two will explore the contrast between markets and
families as organizational milieux. It describes both in accordance
with the separate spheres ideology of the late nineteenth century.
It is this ideology that explicitly establishes the links between men
and markets, and women and families. The ideology of the modern
securities market tracks the description of the market within the
separate spheres conception. Behavior often associated with men,
such as independence and self-interest, is appropriate in the arena
of the market and specifically encouraged in securities markets.
Part Three focuses on United States v. Chestman4° in which the
Second Circuit for the first time identified a factual setting that
limited the extent of insider trading doctrine. Going against estab-
lished law and the facts of the case in front of it, the court went out
of its way to indicate that the family-based setting of Chestman was
not an appropriate context for finding a violation of the insider
trading rules. This is a central case in the effort to confine insider
trading law, a market doctrine, to the market. Failure to delineate
the line between the market and the family in this rigorous manner
might make it unclear which behaviors were appropriate where.
Such a blurring of the line, and consequent failure to pursue one's
own self-interest doggedly within the market, would increase ineffi-
ciency within the markets and ultimately put the entire system at
risk. Thus, drawing the line on the'expansion of insider trading be-
fore it engulfed family interactions is ideologically crucial to the
maintenance of our market system. It is also intimately interre-
lated to our understanding of the divide between men and women.
40. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
1998]
312 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 4:303
Part Four displays the simultaneous flexibility and power of
gender-associated ideas. Both efficiency and equality are market/
male-associated norms. However, within insider trading law, the
values of efficiency and equality become pitted against each other.
One can have either an efficient market or one with equal access to
information but not both. In this struggle, efficiency assumes a
male position while equality becomes associated with the female.4
Chiarella and Dirks represent efficiency's triumph over equality -
a triumph to be expected given efficiency's association with the
male. The triumph of efficiency is masked, however, by the refocus-
ing of the emphasis on relationship. Indeed, we are more than
willing to focus attention on the concept of relationship because it
has been imported from the realm of family. Sitting there as it does
in the center of the masculine-identified law of insider trading, the
idea of relationships appears anomalous. The importation of a
concept usually associated with family into the center of insider
trading law draws our attention in that direction and away from
the domination of efficiency over equality within insider trading law
itself.
Thus, this article shows how gender exercises a tremendous,
hidden influence on the law of insider trading. It naturalizes cer-
tain characteristics of the market causing us to take their presence
for granted and it makes the drawing of lines between the market
and family appear unproblematic. Similarly, even within the ideal
of the market, the tension between goals of efficiency and equality
is understood, and the triumph of efficiency is accepted because of
the realignment of equality with female and efficiency with male.
Once these values are assigned to these new gendered positions, we
expect efficiency to win out over equality.
Gender normalizes the privileging of one side over the other.
Despite this, the gendered connection between efficiency and male
characteristics, and equality and female characteristics is neither
preordained nor required. Justice Ginsburg, in her opinion in
O'Hagan, was able to reconstruct the misappropriation theory so
that its adoption would strengthen, not undermine, the maleness
of the market.42 This happened despite the misappropriation
theory's earlier identification with equality. Characteristics that
41. This analysis of the assigning of genders to equality and efficiency as they interact
in tension with each other is heavily influenced by MARY JOE FRUG, Rescuing Impossibility
Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, in POSTMODERN LEGAL FEM-
INISM, supra note 30, at 111-24 (discussing the gendered positions of two opposing inter-
pretations of impossibility doctrine in contract law).
42. United States v. O'Hagan, 177 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-13 (1997).
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are most frequently associated with men, such as equality, can be
reconceptualized as female; however, returning them to their initial
valence is relatively easy. Gender, after all, is socially constructed,
and can be socially reconstructed.
II. SEPARATE SPHERES IDEOLOGY: THE MARKET AND THE FAMILY:
THEN AND Now
Our perception of the market as male derives from the
nineteenth-century's division of the world into the separate spheres
of family and market. The woman's place was in the family, the
man's place in the market. As a claim about the ideology of the
market, this establishes a normative vision. However, it also
influences our understanding of existent markets. The first section
below describes the nineteenth-century separate spheres ideology
of family and market. The second section discusses how this
influence affects modern commentators' and courts' perceptions of
activities in the market.
A. The Nineteenth-Century Ideology of Separate Spheres
Historians of the nineteenth century describe an ideology that
dominated that period and divided life into two, separate spheres:
home and market. Women were relegated to the home, with all of
its pleasures and limitations, while the market was a man's world,
also rewarding and constricting in its own ways.43 Much of the
struggle of feminists in the second half of the twentieth century has
been to overcome the constraints of this way of thinking. More than
fifty percent of women with young children work outside of the
home today and one even begins to read stories of men who devote
their days entirely to the job of raising their children and keeping
house." Yet, the old ideas about the nature of the market and the
43. For a full discussion of the idea of separate spheres, see generally NANCY F. COTr,
THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977). See
also Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 284 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983) (arguing that
much of the separate spheres ideology and its approach to the family and the market derives
from the work of John Locke).
44. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES: 1996.
In 1996, both parents were employed in 63.9% of married couple households. See id. Also,
53.4% of mothers with children under the age of one year were employed in the labor force,
while 63.3% of those with children two years of age were employed. See id.
Approximately two million fathers stay home to raise their children full-time. See Stay-
at-Home Fathers, Still a Rarity, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 13, 1997, at A24.
For other examples of stories about stay-at-home dads, see Diane Naughton, Being Dad Full
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home continue to influence how we think about the world.
The "market" is an abstraction used to describe people's
economic relations with one another.45 According to the ideology of
separate spheres, the market was a man's world. This was so clear
to nineteenth-century census takers that they could not. even
conceive of assigning occupations to women. Leonore Davidoff and
Catherine Hall describe the process in nineteenth-century England
whereby the census came to identify men, and only men, with
particular occupations.46 Women and children were left unclassi-
fied, "from the impossibility of deciding whether females of the
family . . . were to be classed as if of no occupation or of the
occupation of the adult males of the family." It did not occur to
the census takers that women might have independent occupations.
Observers of the time also noted women's absence from the market.
Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most famous observers of
nineteenth-century America, wrote, "American women never
manage the outward concerns of the family or conduct a business
... nor are they ... ever compelled to perform the rough labor of
the field ... .48 Thus, the ideology of separate spheres identified
men, not women, with the market.49
Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1996, at D5; Joel Dresang, Stay at Home Dads Talk Shop,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 1996, at 2.
45. See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1502 (1983).
46. See LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES 229-71 (1987).
47. Id. at 230.
48. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve & Francis Bowen
trans., 1945), quoted in NANCY GREY OSTERUD, BONDS OF COMMUNITY: THE LIVES OF FARM
WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 141 (1991).
49. Of course, de Tocqueville was wrong. In reality, women did participate in the market
despite the ideal that they should not do so. For discussions of women's work outside of the
home, see generally OSTERUD, supra note 48 (discussing rural women); Gerda Lerner, The
Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson, 1800-1840,
in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN 182, 189-93 (Nancy F. Cott & Elizabeth H. Pleck eds., 1979)
(discussing factory labor); Thomas Dublin, Women, Work, and Protest in the Early Lowell
Mills: 'The Oppressing Hand of Avarice Would Enslave Us," in 1 WOMEN AND POWER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 144 (Kathryn Kish Sklar & Thomas Dublin eds., 1991) (factory labor);
DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 46, at 283-85, 301-04 (discussing family businesses and trade);
JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW (1985) (discussing Black women). For
a discussion of the inapplicability of the separate spheres ideology to Black women, see
HAZEL V. CARBY, RECONSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD 20-39 (1987). For a discussion of the
importance of class in the image of the ideal woman, see Lisa J. Disch, Book Review, 17
SIGNS 214 (1991). For a discussion of how women who worked outside the home remained
oriented toward their homes, see Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That
Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819.
INSIDER TRADING AND FAMILY VALUES
The men who traded within the market were, according to the
classical economists, self-interested people.' They acted to promote
their own well-being, not out of a desire to assist others. Adam
Smith, one of the first to articulate the classical basis of market
theory, described self-interested behavior as "in the very nature of
our being."51 According to Smith, men act when they perceive
a bargain of any kind .... It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own interest. We address
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.52
Men acting in the market were also assumed to be rational.
According to the classical economists, these rational men acted to
increase pleasure rather than pain and to maximize their happi-
ness. One man's pleasure would differ from another's but each
could be expected to act to increase his own happiness.5 3 In addi-
tion to acting rationally, men, in the market, act anonymously and
autonomously; in the market there is "little scope for social
sentiments."54 They act on their own without pre-existing connec-
tions or duties to others.
Classical economists did not decry this self-interested market
behavior. Instead, they considered "selfish and calculating" be-
havior in the market to be wholly appropriate.55 This was because
they saw the market as a means of harnessing self-interest and
turning it into a mechanism for the joint production of goods and
50. The term "classical economists" applies to the school founded by Adam Smith and
amplified by Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and others. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 292-323 (1979). For an article that shows a similar connection
between men and self-interest in modern economic theory, see Terry O'Neill, Trust is For
Girls, Presented at the Annual Conference for the Society for the Advancement of Socio-
Economics (1996) (unpublished paper) (on file with Terry O'Neill, Tulane University)
(discussing Oliver Williamson's work).
51. Samuel Hollander, Adam Smith and the Self-Interest Axiom, 20 J.L. & ECON. 133, 139
(1977) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (E.G. West ed., 1966)).
52. Id. at 140 (quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 22 (Kathryn Sutherland ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776)).
53. See ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 295-96; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 3 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the assumption of rationality). But see R.H. Coase, Adam
Smith's View of Man, 19 J.L. & ECON. 529, 545 (1976) (criticizing the idea that Smith believed
men rationally pursued their self interest in a single-minded manner).
54. Hollander, supra note 51, at 139. See ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 295-97; SMITH, supra
note 51, at 3; Coase, supra note 53, at 541. In contrast, it is clear that classical economists
recognized there are bonds that tie people to others outside of the market, but within their
families. See Coase, supra note 51, at 534.
55. COTT, supra note 43, at 64, 67-71.
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services.56 According to Ronald Coase's description of classical
economics, 'The great advantage of the market is that it is able to
use-the strength of self-interest... so that those who are unknown,
unattractive, or unimportant, will have their wants served."57
Through bargaining with others, wants on both sides of a transac-
tion are satisfied thus increasing the public welfare without any
need for altruistic feelings towards others.
According to classical economists, the market is also non-
hierarchical.58 All men, regardless of who they are, have wants that
they try to satisfy, and all men are potential bargaining partners.
Men in the market are not only equal vis-a-vis their potential
ability to satisfy others' wants, they are also equal in relation to the
state.59 As a result, classical economics does not call for any state
intervention in the market. Indeed, by assuming a highly competi-
tive marketplace, even bargaining power among individuals could
be seen as equal.6 °
Under the separate spheres ideology, the home, the family, and
women provided a direct contrast to the autonomous, self-interested
nature of men and the market. Indeed, a home was often defined
in direct opposition to the market. If the market intruded on the
home in any way, it was not a true home. Thus, John Ruskin wrote,
[Home] is the place of peace .... In so far... as the anxieties
of the outer life penetrate into it, and ... the outer world is
allowed by either husband or wife to cross the threshold it
ceases to be a home; it is then only a part of the outer world
which you have roofed over and lighted fire in."'
Repeatedly, the home was referred to as a refuge from the market
and rest of the world, not a part of that world. 2
Just as the market was identified with men, so the home was
identified with women and families. One of the most important
56. See ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 299. Cf. Coase, supra note 53, at 535-41.
57. Coase, supra note 53, at 544.
58. Historians also describe the actual changes experienced in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries as a move from the patriarchal relations of master and servant
to the more formally equal relations of employer and employee in the modern market. See
COTT, supra note 43, at 66.
59. See Olsen, supra note 45, at 1502.
60. See ATIYAH, supra note 50, at 340. For a full discussion of the idea of equal
bargaining power, see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract
and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power,
41 MD. L. REV. 563,614-24 (1982).
61. Kate Millet, The Debate over Women: Ruskin vs. Mill, in SUFFER AND BE STILL 121,
130-31 (Martha Vicinus ed., 1972).
62. See COTT, supra note 43, at 64-68.
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attributes of a nineteenth-century woman, according to the separate
spheres ideology, was domesticity: 'The true woman's place was
unquestionably by her own fireside . . . [and] domesticity was
among the virtues most prized" in women.63 A woman's place was
quite clearly believed to be in the home, but also, her presence made
it a home:
[W]herever a true wife comes ... home is always round her.
The stars only may be over her head, the glow-worm in the
night-cold grass may be the only fire at her foot, but home is
wherever she is; and for a noble woman it stretches far round
her, better than ceiled with cedar or painted with vermillion,
shedding its quiet light far for those who else were homeless.64
Unlike men, women were not supposed to be motivated
primarily by their own interests or by the desire to make money.65
Nancy Cott describes women as having been thought to be "disin-
terested" both because they escaped from the competitive economic
pressures of the market and because they were economically
dependent on the men of their families.66 "Disinterested," in this
context, meant that they were motivated in accordance with the
interests of other members of their families, not their own.67
Women's work consisted in maintaining social contacts, keeping
members of their families happy, and ensuring the moral virtue of
their children and husbands. A nineteenth-century bride wrote, "In
every thing I must consult the interest, the happiness and the
welfare of My Husband... may it be my constant study to make
him contented and happy, and then will my own happiness be
sure."'  Disinterested women were supposed to be ready to
63. Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 162 (1966);
see also, MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS 3-9 (1980) (describing women's domestic
roles in the eighteenth century); Mary S. Hoffschwelle, Women's Sphere and the Creation of
Female Community in the Antebellum South: Three Tennessee Slaveholding Women, 50
TENN. HIST. Q. 80, 83-85 (1991) (describing women's domestic roles in the antebellum South);
ANN DOUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 63-64 (1977) (summarizing a
popular novel of the 1850s in which a girl unsuccessfully tries to "participate in the 'wide,
wide world' of masculine competition and business;" ultimately, she retreats to her home).
64. Millet, supra note 61, at 131.
65. See Welter, supra note 63, at 160; COTr, supra note 43, at 52-53.
66. COTT, supra note 43, at 70-71.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original) (quoting Diary of Eunice Hale Wait Cobb, vol. 1, p.
29, Sept. 10, 1822 (on file at the Boston Public Library)). For another example of women's
orientation toward others in their families, examine the relationship between Emma and her
father. See JANE AUSTIN, EMMA (James Kinsley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (showing a
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"sacrifice everything at the altar of affection." 9  Some modern
feminists argue that women in the late twentieth century continue
to identify their own interests with those of other members of their
families.7"
Separate spheres ideology also contrasted women with men in
that women were not seen to be rational creatures. Instead, they
were sentimental and emotional. One woman doctor described men
as having "robust intellects," while in women she recognized
"tenderness and love . . . and devotional sentiment. 71 Another
woman wrote in 1875, "Women's thoughts are impelled by their
feelings. Hence... the direct insight, the quick perceptions. Hence
also their warmer prejudices and more unbalanced judgments, and
their infrequent use of the masculine methods of ratiocination. 72
Not surprisingly, these psychological characteristics fit well with
women's primary work of tending to Others' needs.
Women were responsible for the moral life of the family. It was
up to them to provide a proper education for their children and to
encourage their husbands to live a virtuous life.73 One minister
said,
We look to you, ladies, to raise the standard of character in our
own sex; we look to you, to guard and fortify those barriers,
which still exist in society, against the encroachments of impu-
dence and licentiousness. We look to you for the continuance of
domestick purity, for the revival of domestick religion, for the
increase of our charities, and the support of what remains of
religion in our private habits and publick institutions.74
good daughter's concern for her father's comfort, to the extent that she almost relinquishes
marriage to the one she loves so as not to inconvenience her father).
69. COTT, supra note 43, at 64.
70. See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 81 (1987); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Joan Williams, Gender Wars:
Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991); Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1991).
71. ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF
MODERN FEMINISM 15 (1982).
72. Id. at 16. See also Pateman, supra note 43, at 284; Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Beauty,
the Beast and the Militant Woman: A Case Study in Sex Roles and Social Stress in
Jacksonian America, in 1 WOMEN AND POWER IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 49, at 190
(describing women as innocent, defenseless, gentle, and passive).
73. See COTT, supra note 43, at 69-70, 118. See also JACQUELINE JONES, SOLDIERS OF
LIGHT AND LOVE 109-11 (1980) (describing the role of Northern women in teaching morality
to Black children in the post-Civil War South).
74. CoTr, supra note 43, at 148.
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Because women were not expected to be aggressive or powerful,
they had no authority to require that others meet their moral
expectations. Instead, they were expected to be able to "influence"
the other people in their lives so that these others would act
appropriately. It was expected that to achieve their goals, women
might have to act in ways that were unexposed and secret. Ann
Douglas termed this influence 'less outspoken than insidious ....
[Women] proudly claimed.., that they... wished to address the
unconscious as much as the conscious life of their audience. 75
Harriet Farley, an editor of the Lowell Offering, a magazine for the
mill girls, defined her purpose as to "do good by stealth. ' 76 Thus,
although women were strongly associated with the inculcation of
moral virtues, their own actions were not always seen as open and
honest. Their role was to keep others on the high road of gentle-
manliness, even if they themselves occassionally had to resort to
work in secret.
Family relations within the separate spheres ideology are
hierarchical. Unlike the market, the family is not a place for
equals. Within the family, the wife and children are seen as
subordinate to the husband.77 An ideal of early nineteenth-century
marriage was that a mature husband would guide and advise a
young wife, not that partners of similar ages would guide and
advise each other.7 ' Even John Stuart Mill, the great defender of
women's equality, does not question the patriarchal structure of the
family.7 ' Long after the market had begun to dismantle class
hierarchies in commercial relationships, the gender hierarchy
remained an acceptable one in family relations.8 °
Despite the fact that the separate spheres ideology treated the
home and the market as distinct from one another, they were part
of a single system. Christopher Lasch argued that as work became
increasingly specialized and routinized, it became less of an end in
75. DOUGLAS, supra note 63, at 69.
76. Id. at 71.
77. See Welter, supra note 63, at 158-62 (describing submissiveness as a womanly virtue).
See also DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 46, at 114-15 (making a connection between
subordination and religious beliefs); Olsen, supra note 45, at 1504-07 (describing the
hierarchical structure of families); Barbara Easton, Feminism and the Contemporary Family,
in A HERITAGE OF HER OWN, supra note 49, at 558-60 (describing women's subordination to
men in the nineteenth century); Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family,
67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 967-68 (discussing the continuing authority of parents over children).
78. See DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 46, at 327.
79. See Pateman, supra note 43, at 292-95.
80. See ROSENBERG, supra note 71, at 3.
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and of itself."1 Instead, work simply became a means to a satisfying
life outside of work.82 The family provided a haven for those who
worked in the cold, impersonal market. As one nineteenth-century
pastor said,
It is at home, where man ... seeks a refuge from the vexations
and embarrassments of business.., a relaxation from care by
the interchange of affection.., where is the treasury of pure
disinterested love, such as is seldom found in the busy walks of
a selfish and calculating world. 3
Thus, one way in which the relationship between the market
and the home can be interpreted is that the existence of a home -
of a "separate sphere" - made it possible for men to endure their
daily life in the market. A nineteenth-century essay on marriage
expressed exactly this idea:
When he struggles on in the path of duty, the thought that it is
for her in part he toils will sweeten his labors .... Should he
meet dark clouds and storms abroad, yet sunshine and peace
await him at home; and when his proud heart would resent the
language of petty tyrants... from whom he receives the scanty
renumeration for his daily labors, the thought that she perhaps
may suffer thereby, will calm the tumult of his passions, and
bid him struggle on, and find his reward in her sweet tones, and
soothing kindness, and that the bliss of home is thereby made
more apparent.84
Another way to understand the relationship between the
market and the home, however, is to, conceive of them together as
allowing men to express their whole range of emotions. While men
in the market were expected to be calculating and self-interested,
once they returned to their homes their warmer, more altruistic
feelings could be expressed. Even Adam Smith admitted that men
experienced great sympathy for members of their immediate
families: "It approaches... to what he feels for himself."8 " Within
81. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESEIGED 6-8
(1975).
82. See id.
83. COTr, supra note 43, at 64.
84. Id. at 69-70. See also, MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 145-55 (1981)
(describing the home as providing a private retreat from the tumult and heterogeneity of the
market); GILLIAN BROWN, DOMESTIC INDIVIDUALISM 3 (1990) (describing the home as a site
of permanency in contrast to the caprices of the market).
85. Coase, supra note 53, at 534.
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the home, men were allowed to endulge in tears, and being "tender-
hearted" at home was by no means considered inappropriate.86
The existence of a home different and separate from the market
allowed men to act one way in the market and a somewhat different
way at home. In short, it created more possibilities for a range of
emotions, allowing men to be fuller people than if they were limited
to the emotions and styles of action permitted in the market.
Nancy Cott argues:
[The canon of domesticity did not directly challenge the modem
organization of work and pursuit of wealth. Rather, it accom-
modated and promised to temper them. The values of domestic-
ity undercut opposition to exploitative pecuniary standards in
the work world, by upholding a "separate sphere" of comfort and
compensation... and fostering the idea that preservation of
home and family sentiment was an ultimate goal. 7
Thus, the existence of home and women, and their strong
association with emotion and care for others, allowed the market to
continue to exist with only a limited range of permissible behaviors.
It made it possible for men to be competitive and self-serving within
the market, knowing that they could indeed be more than this
outside of the market.8 It also made it possible for us, as a society,
to accept a market in which self-interest was the dominant motive.
Without the separate, recognizable sphere of family, the market
would appear reprehensible and undefensible. It is the existence of
the separate sphere along side the market, that allows the market
to continue to exist.
B. The Securities Market as Ideal Market
The concept of the ideal market has influenced the inter-
pretation of the securities market so that, within the law of insider
trading, the securities market is understood as having the charac-
teristics of the ideal market. As such, it is already in opposition to
the institution of the family. As in the idealized market of separate
spheres, securities traders owe each other no duties. They act
86. See DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 46, at 111.
87. COTT, supra note 43, at 69. See also Welter, supra note 31, at 151 (explaining that
the existence of "home" allows men to salve their consciences for participation in the
materialistic market).
88. The market was also associated with the positive values of progress, self-reliance, and
modernization. Olsen, supra note 45, at 1500. Like the existence of the home, these positive
values had the effect of making the market ideologically viable. See id.
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autonomously, motivated by their own self-interest. As with the
ideal market, this pursuit of self-interest is seen as ultimately bene-
ficial to everyone. Additionally, like the ideal market of separate
spheres ideology, the securities market is also seen as populated by
males.89 Finally, when cases raise issues about conduct within the
market, they are resolved in ways that maintain the consistency
with the idealized market. When market participants could be
understood to act out of any of a number of motives, courts tend to
see them as acting from personal self-interest, as the ideal image
predicts that people will act within the market.
As with the market in general, traders in the securities market
act autonomously from one another. As a general rule, there are no
duties owed to other traders under Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court
made this rule very clear in Chiarella v. U.S.9° Chiarella, a "mark
up man" for a financial printer, had figured out how to decipher
crucial information purposely left temporarily blank in documents
for corporate takeover bids.9 The SEC argued that, because he had
information that other traders did not possess, he was trading on
inside information in violation of Rule 10b-5. The Court rejected
this argument.
The Court held that Chiarella owed no duties to the target
company or to its shareholders. As to both, he was a complete
stranger. It said,
No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the
sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had no
prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not
a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger
who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market
transactions.92
89. It should be clear that I am speaking on an ideological level here. In reality, women
do play roles in the securities markets. Thirty-nine percent of securities industry profes-
sionals and 28% of managers and officers are women. See Jon Birger, Hiring Women: Ladies
Who Power Lunch Make Gains in Securities, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., June 16, 1997, at 25 (quoting
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission statistics); Margaret A. Jacobs, Securities
Firms Are Failing Short on Hiring Women and Minorities, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1994, at B10
(stating similar statistics); Dennis Taylor, Creating Security Investment Expertise and
Common Sense Have Earned Jane Williams Her Clients' Trust, Bus. J.- SAN JOSE, May 26,
1997, at 9 (describing an individual woman's successful career path within the securities
industry).
90. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
91. See id. at 224.
92. Id. at 232-33. See also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983)
(finding no duties to others in market); SEC v. Mayhew, 916 F. Supp. 123, 129 (D. Conn.
1995) (describing the relationship between an investment banking firm and its client's
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Participants in the securities market are considered strangers to
one another in the same way as participants in the ideal market of
classical economics.
The same theme emerges in the cases dealing with insiders'
liability to option traders under Rule 10b-5. Many courts have held
that insiders who trade in corporate shares do not owe a duty to
those who trade in-options.93 Like the printer in Chiarella, option
traders are denominated "strangers" to those insiders who have
traded in corporate stock. Since they trade in different markets,
there is no "transactional nexus" between defendant's trading and
any losses the plaintiff may have suffered.94 As strangers, the
trading insiders owe no duty to option traders.
Securities traders who owe no duties to others are naturally
free to pursue their own self-interest. Indeed, as in the ideal
classical market, not only are they at liberty to do so, but it is
considered a positive good if they do. In Dirks v. SEC,95  the
Supreme Court emphasized both the inevitability and the desirabil-
ity of self-interested behavior.96 As part of its decision, the Court
rejected the position advanced by the SEC that the mere possession
of nonpublic information was enough to impose an obligation to
disclose or abstain from trading.97
Despite this, the Dirks Court understood market efficiency as
dependent on the analysts' work in ferreting out information that
potential target in the market as "at arms length" and creating no fiduciary duty); William
T. Allen, Professor Scheppele's Middle Way, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 177-78 (1993)
(discussing the lack of moral obligation to others in anonymous markets).
93. Compare Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983), and
Starkman v. Warner Communications Inc., 671 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), with O'Connor
& Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp 1179 (S.D.N.Y 1981) (allowing the
option-holders' suit to continue). The O'Connor result was statutorily affirmed by the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, amending the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(d) (1994)). There are cases going in both directions under Rule 10b-5, where the issue
revolves around either affirmative misrepresentations or failures to disclose. Compare
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502 (3d Cir. 1988) (allowing option trader to sue
in affirmative misrepresentation case), and Fry v. UAL Corp., 895 F. Supp 1018 (N.D. ill.
1995), with Lerner v. SciMed Life Sys., Civ. No. 3-92-537, 1994 WL 374319 (D. Minn. Feb.
9, 1994) (denying suit to option trader in nondisclosure case), and In Re McDonnell Douglas
Corp. Sec. Litig., 567 F. Supp 126 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (holding the same as Lerner).
94. Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407, 412 (8th Cir. 1983); Starkman
v. Warner Communications Inc., 671 F. Supp. 297, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
95. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
96. See id. at 667. The Court's emphasis may seem ironic because, in deciding Dirks, it
relied heavily on the claim that Dirk's informant, Secrist, received no personal benefit from
passing the information on to Dirks. According to the Court, Secrist had not acted for
personal gain. See id.
97. See id. at 658.
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might otherwise only emerge more slowly.9" It noted, "[T]he ana-
lyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors."99 The Court re-
cognized that market analysts do not work to uncover new infor-
mation purely out of the goodness of their hearts. They work be-
cause to do so produces personal profit; they can sell via market let-
ters any new information for which clients are willing to pay. °° If
they could not profit from the information, they would, according to
the Court, be less willing to search for it. Finding liability under
Rule 10b-5 for anyone who had traded on material, non-public in-
formation would mean that the analysts would be unable to profit
from their efforts. The Court said, "Imposing [such] a duty ...
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts,
which.., is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.''
As in the ideal market, the Dirks Court's image of the securities
market is that it is a place where traders act to advance their own
interests and, in doing so, augment the general good.
Indeed, the Court recognized that, in general, an individual's
most likely motive in passing on relevant, non-public information
to another is personal profit. In Dirks, the Court quoted Victor
Brudney's statement that "[The insider, by giving the information
out selectively, is in effect selling the information to its recipient for
cash, reciprocal information, or other things of value for
himself ....""'02 Brudney was arguing that tippees should be in the
same position as the tippers who presumably have gained by
divulging the information,' but the basic understanding of why
people act as they do in the market is unchanged; they want to
make a profit for themselves. 10
4
The courts see the profit motive as so powerful that they are
willing to assume it is the operative motive in many cases in which
we would otherwise believe that the motive was predominately
altruistic. 105 The Supreme Court strengthened this assumption in
98. See id. at 658 n.17.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 658-59.
101. Id. at 658.
102. Id. at 664.
103. See Brudney, supra note 25, at 347-48.
104. See id. See also United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
a tipper can be assumed to recognize that the tippee's interest in the inside information is
"not for nothing").
105. Anthropologists and historians have long noted the curious connections between
altruism and self-interest. See FRANZ BOAZ, THE KWAKIUTL OF VANCOUVER ISLAND (1909)
(discussing the role of potlatches in an economy of gifts). See also KENNETH S. GREENBERG,
HONOR AND SLAVERY (1996) (discussing the economic and hegemonic meaning of gifts in the
antebellum South).
1998] INSIDER TRADING AND FAMILY VALUES 325
Dirks by linking the test for breach of a fiduciary duty in violation
of the insider trading prohibition to "whether the insider personally
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure."'" As the
Court recognized, this is not an easy standard to apply.1"' Identify-
ing pecuniary gain is difficult because the standard applies not only
to situations involving present gain, but also to situations in which
we can imagine that the disclosure might create some future
pecuniary benefit to the tipper or trader. Thus, situations in which
one's professional reputation improves as a result of the tip or
trade,108 or in which one is saved the expense of a future gift of
money,0 9 are included.
' The same assumption, that people within the market act from
motives of personal gain, animates the seminal work of Henry
Manne."' Manne emphasizes the benefits to society in general that
will accrue from self-interested behavior on the part of each indi-
vidual."' Manne's work carries this one step farther, however, por-
traying the markets as sites for male activities. This creates yet an-
other similarity to the ideal market. I do not mean to say that
Manne overtly claims that only men can be brokers, traders,
106. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
107. See id. at 664 ("Determining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular
disclosure... will not always be easy for courts.").
108. See id. at 663.
109. See id. at 664. It is interesting that the Court endorses such a broad definition of
pecuniary benefit in Dirk, a case in which it then disregards its own directives and finds
that Dirks's tipper, Secrist, did not obtain such a benefit. The Court claims that Secrist did
not benefit monetarily from tipping Dirks. See id. at 667. But this is far from clear. Secrist
was a former officer of Equity Funding. See id. at 649. Although the Court does not indicate
why he left his position, it must have recognized that if the departure was due to
disagreements of any type between Secrist and Equity Funding, Secrist's reputation would
undoubtedly improve if the scandalous information he was pushing was disclosed. See id.
at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Similarly, the Court is not inclined to focus its attention on the advantages that Secrist's
gift of information provided to Dirks, although these may well have substituted for a
monetary gift. Dirks discussed the tip with his clients, some of whom then sold their
holdings of Equity Funding. See id. at 649. These sales were not transacted through Dirks's
firm because it did not trade in Equity Funding, but some of those with whom Dirks spoke
may have subsequently promised to direct business to Dirks's firm. Since he was paid on a
commission basis, this would redound to his benefit. See id. at 676 n.13 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
110. HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). See also Dirks, 463
U.S. at 677 n.14 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting this connection). This is an
underlying assumption of-all work in law and economics. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVER-
COMING LAW 17 (1995) (referring to "economic theory with all its normative as well as
positive baggage, such as efficiency and wealth maximization"); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (4th ed. 1992) (economics assumes that man is a "rational maxi-
mizer of his... 'self-interest"').
111. See MANNE, supra note 110, at 1-15.
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analysts or other market participants, any more than a nineteenth-
century believer in the separate spheres ideology would have denied
that women could ever participate in the market. Rather, I mean
that when Manne thinks about the securities market, he thinks
about it as populated by people with stereotypically male character-
istics. Like the market of separate spheres ideology, Manne views
the securities market as a man's domain. Because we already have
an ideal type of market in mind with these characteristics, it is that
much easier for us to accept Manne's position.
These claims about Manne's work can be illustrated by an
analysis of the portion of his book Insider Trading and the Stock
Market which discusses insider trading.112 He argues that entrepre-
neurs play a special, innovative role within the modern corpo-
ration."3 For Manne, the question is how to compensate the entre-
preneur's work. According to Manne, neither salaries, profit-shar-
ing plans, nor bonuses provide appropriate compensation.' 14 He
notes, however, that insider trading "meets all the conditions for
appropriately compensating entrepreneurs."1 5 It allows the sale of
information about the particular innovation without requiring that
the insider be given a proprietary interest in the information. The
sale price would be in relation to the expected value of the informa-
tion. Thus, Manne sees insider trading as the appropriate way to
compensate the entrepreneur. As a result, he argues against reg-
ulation of insider trading. 116
In order to be satisfied that entrepreneurs would consider the
ability to trade on inside information as appropriate compensation,
Manne had to develop a profile of the entrepreneur." 7 His charac-
terization tracks the depiction of men in separate spheres ideology.
112. MANNE, supra note 110, at 131-158. Manne's work initiated an important debate
over the desirability of the insider trading prohibition. See generally Dennis W. Carlton &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 857 n.1 (1983)
(generally supporting Manne and describing his book as "brillant" and as "[tihe starting point
for anyone interested in the [literature on insider trading]'); Note, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term: Insider Trading, 97 HARV. L. REV. 286, 289 (1983) (calling Manne's work "pathbreak-
ing"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 83 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985) (stating that Manne offered the "first careful economic treatment of insider trading);
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 23, at 629-34 (disagreeing with Manne that insider trading
provides an appropriate form of management compensation); Schotland, supra note 25, at
1448-57 (disagreeing with Manne); Georgakopoulos, supra note 23, at 17-35 (offering
justifications for regulation of insider trading).
113. See MANNE, supra note 110, at 131-58.
114. See id. at 134-35.
115. Id. at 138.
116. See id. at 131-38.
117. See id. at 141-43.
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Manne does not describe entrepreneurs in any detail, but his brief
description runs as follows: an entrepreneur is self-confident, but
not a good organization man.11 In this way, the entrepreneur is
portrayed as a maverick, an independent actor. Relationships with
others are not crucial to the entrepreneur's activities. In fact, while
Manne recognized that entrepreneurs may occasionally be found in
"older-style" family businesses, these were clearly not the settings
in which he expected the entrepreneur to be located. 119
Perhaps the most salient feature of the entrepreneur described
by Manne is that he is male. Manne repeatedly uses the male
pronoun in writing about entrepreneurs.121 Of course, this is not
surprising given that he was writing thirty years ago. But the male
pronoun also fits the character of the person he is describing. For
Manne, the entrepreneur's historical ancestor is the inventer in the
attic while today's counterpart is the scientist in the laboratory.'12
Others who have examined similar images of the creative
genius within the dominant American cultural imagination have
noted that it is an image of men, acting in isolation. 22  The
entrepreneur is not an "organization man." Presumably this means
that he does not easily accommodate others' needs and deficiencies.
He cannot work well in a team. Similarly, his self-confidence
emphasizes his self-sufficiency. He does not need others in order to
be creative. His creativity, being unpredictable, comes not from
working hard in conjunction with others, but rather from within
himself. Manne's entrepreneur fits this model.
If we think of the stereotypes of men and women that are part
of the separate spheres ideology, the entrepreneur, as described by
Manne, is a man. Men work alone while women work within net-
works and to preserve relationships. 21 Men are traditionally
thought of as gruff and self-confident, while women are diffident
118. See id. at 141.
119. See id. at 142.
120. See, e.g., id. at 116, 118, 119, 120, 121. For Manne, all important participants in the
market appear to be male, including managers and capitalists. See id. at 115, 119.
121. See id. at 127. Elsewhere, however, Manne distinguishes entrepreneurs from
inventors on the grounds that the latter are really only innovative when they put their ideas
into motion, a process that has become highly bureaucratized in the United States. See id.
at 117.
122. See Kenneth Greenberg, Creativity: From Asexual to Sexual Production, in
CREATIVITY AND LIBERAL LEARNING 35 (David Tuerck, ed. 1987). See also EVELYN FOX
KELLER, A FEELING FOR THE ORGANISM (1983) (describing Barbara McClintock's work in
isolation from the scientific community, as well as the way scientific knowledge depends on
the interplay of many people's work).
123. See discussion of the ideal woman under a separate spheres ideology, supra notes 61-
80 and accompanying text.
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and insecure. Certainly, the world that Manne sees the entrepre-
neur inhabiting has traditionally been the work world of men:
corporate managers, lawyers, investment bankers, scientists. Even
today, the securities industry is dominated by men.124
The final proof - if there ever is proof in this type of analysis
- that Manne's entrepreneur is male comes from Manne's under-
standing of his motivation. Entrepreneurs, Manne asserted, are
attracted to those positions offering them the "greatest opportunity
... to make large, indefinite gains." '125  Unlike women, who are
traditionally believed to be motivated by love or beauty, Manne's
male entrepreneur is motivated by the stereotypical male objective:
money. It is this that makes insider trading, with its potential for
large gains, the appropriate form of compensation. Manne's
entrepreneur is the classic profit-maximizing male.
126
Thus, Manne's work clarifies the picture of the securities
market as an idealized market consistent with the separate spheres
ideology. The securities market, like the idealized market of clas-
sical economics, is seen as a place where people do not owe duties
to others, where people act in pursuit of their own self-interest (to
124. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 39% of securities
professionals and 28% of managers and officers are women. See Birger, supra note 89, at 25.
At Merrill Lynch, approximately 16% of brokers are women. See Patrick McGeehan, Duo
Pursues Sex-Bias Cases on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1997, at C1. According to
others, there are no firm statistics on the percentage of professional positions in the
securities industry held by women, but women are probably underrepresented in the
industry. See Miriam Hill, Wall Street is Still Frontier for Women and Minorities, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 24, 1997, at 2C; E-mail message from Pam Faber, Staff Adviser,
Diversity Committee, Securities Information Association, to Professor Judith Greenberg,
New England School of Law (July 15, 1997) (on file with Professor Judith Greenberg) ('CThere
are no statistics available vis-h-vis the number of women in the securities industry.'). A rash
of recent sex discrimination law suits have made clear the difficulties for women employees
on Wall Street. See James T. Madore & Susan Harrigan, Wolves Among the Bulls and
Bears/Male Dominance Said to Promote Wall St. Abuses, NEWSDAY, May 1, 1997, at A59;
McGeehan, supra; John C. Coffee Jr., Sex and the Securities Industry, N.Y. L. J., May 29,
1997, at 5 col.1. See also Scheppele, supra note 25, at 146 n.92 (justifying the use of the
male pronoun to refer to insider traders in order to "call special attention to the fact that
almost all the inside traders are men').
125. MANNE, supra note 110, at 155.
126. Manne deals with the possibility that the insider will pass the information on to
members of his family or others instead of selling it, as just another form of profit taking.
"It is immaterial... that an individual may choose to take his gain in the form of additional
wealth for his children rather than for himself .... ." Id. at 157.
Further evidence that the market is a place for men, but not women, comes from the
courts' treatment of women who end up in the market. Frequently, they are portrayed as
the innocent victims of their husbands', brothers', or fathers' trading. The women them-
selves did not know or understand the market. They were simply relying on the men in their
lives to guide them. It is the men, not the women, who are at home in the market. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 n.3 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that the wife neither knew
nor should have known that the information conveyed to her was confidential).
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the ultimate good of all), and where stereotypical male traits can be
expected. Furthermore, Manne's work is that much more believable
to us because it fits within our idealized images of how a market
ought to operate.
.These images of the market also influence the courts as they
decide cases. In Dirks, the Court held that there was no breach of
a fiduciary duty, and therefore no violation of Rule 10b-5, unless the
breach was for "personal gain."'27 This pronouncement, of course,
needed to be interpreted in subsequent cases. Personal gain could
have been interpreted to mean only pecuniary gain, 2 ' but such a
narrow interpretation would not have been consistent with the
understanding of how men act within the market. They do not act
out of the "womenly" motivations of friendship, love, or affection.
Instead, separate spheres ideology says they act from self-interest.
Consistent with this, the courts understand men in insider trading
situations to be acting so as to advance their own interests. Tips
that might otherwise have appeared to be passed on primarily out
of friendship for the recipient are found to create liability because
they are understood as having been made out of profit motives.
For example, in SEC v. Maio,'29 Ferrero, an insider, had tipped
Maio to a buying opportunity. 3 ° Prior to this, Ferrero and Maio
had been friends for approximately a decade. Even beyond this,
Ferrero felt morally obligated to Maio because Ferrero's close friend
Palamara, on his deathbed, had asked Ferrero to look after Maio. 3'
The market tip at issue in the case was not the first gift of money
that Ferrero had made to Maio. As the court noted, Ferrero's
tipping was "just one of many favors that [Ferrero] has done for
Maio through the years by reason of their friendship."'32 There was
nothing in the facts stated by the court that would lead one to
believe that Ferrero would have received a monetary benefit from
passing this tip to Maio, or that Maio would have been likely to be
able to reciprocate. Instead, the tip was probably a genuine act of
127. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). See also id. at 662 ('ITihe test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.').
128. The Dirks court elsewhere points to a broad interpretation of "personal gain,"
including within that phrase "a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings,"
and "a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend" because this
"resemble[s] trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient."
Id. at 663-64.
129. 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
130. See id. at 626-27.
131. See id. at 627.
132. Id. at 632.
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friendship and an effort to fulfill Ferrero's moral obligations to
Maio.
Despite this, the Seventh Circuit found that Ferrero had
breached a duty in passing the information on to Maio. It cited the
Supreme Court's "personal benefit" rule, and noted that "[t]he
theory is that by disclosing information selectively the insider is, in
effect, selling the information to its recipient for things of value to
himself."13' 3 Friendship, love, or affection never entered into the
court's calculations as possible motives. It simply assumed, in line
with the Supreme Court's dicta in Dirks, that market participants
are motivated by the prospect of personal gain.
The insider trading rules require courts to determine the
tipper's motivation in tipping. Given the ideal of a market in which
participants act from self-interested motives, it is not surprising
that the courts find facts that make the market of the real world
appear consistent with the ideal.134 In doing so, however, they are
undermining the original potential of Dirks's pecuniary gain
requirement to narrow the reach of insider trading law. As the
courts assume that traders' motives are always personal gain, the
pecuniary gain requirement loses its meaning. More and more
actions come to be seen as breaches of fiduciary duty violative of the
insider trading prohibition. What remains constant, however, is the
understanding that men in markets act in self interested ways. In
this way, insider trading law helps to bolster the stereotypical
images of men and women and their appropriate gender roles.
133. Id.
134. See SEC v. Gaspar, No. 83 Civ. 3037, 1985 WL 521 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1985). Gaspar
is another case in which the court has no trouble assuming a profit motive on the part of the
tipper merely from the fact that he is a market player. The court found that the tipper
"depended ... on a constant exchange of information with [the tippee], from whom he also
solicited professional opinions." Id. at *16. This meets the Dirks' pecuniary gain require-
ment. Gaspar could expect other tips to flow his direction as a result of this one. This
sounds initially like a clear situation in which the tipper is expecting gain from the tippee.
But the situation is more complicated. The tipper and the tippee "had a close personal re-
lationship" that went back over 20 years. Id at *5. The court recognized that the tipper's
motive may not have simply been pecuniary gain. It said, "At the very least, Gaspar's dis-
closures constituted a gift as described by the Court in Dirks." Id. at *16. Here, the court
is arguing that even if Gaspar could not expect valuable tips in return for his, even if his was
given without any prospect of monetary gain in return, as a gift it still, under Dirks,
constitutes a violation of insider trading law. This is the case only if the court is willing to
assume, with the Court in Dirks, that the motive underlying all actions in the securities
market, even the giving of gifts, is personal gain or benefit. See also United States v. Libera,
989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that it is permissible to presume "tippee's interest
in the information is, in contemporary jargon, not for nothing'); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Demise of Dirks: Shifting Standards for Tipper-Tippee Liability, 8 INSIGHTS 23 (1994)
(making the same point about Libera).
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III. DEFINING THE LIMITS OF INSIDER TRADING: UNITED STATES
V. CHESTMAN AND THE MEANING OF FAMILY
Viewing the securities market as an ideal market automatically
establishes an opposition between it and the idea of family. This
opposition defines the boundaries of each. Thus, as the courts try
to determine the limits of insider trading, they necessarily confront
the idea of family. This problem was especially acute for the courts
developing the "misappropriation theory" because this theory
reached situations in which material, nonpublic information was
taken from sources who were not necessarily market participants."l 5
To maintain the integrity of the ideologically male market under
the misappropriation theory, courts had to maintain the market's
separation from the female-associated family. They had to draw a
line between cases involving market participants and those in-
volving family members. This line is difficult to draw because fam-
ily members can also be market participants. This difficulty is dra-
matically illustrated in United States v. Chestman.ls6 An analysis
of Chestman shows the importance of courts maintaining a clear
line between market and family. Were this line to disappear, the
distinction between family and market might be blurred, upsetting
our notions of how to act in each realm and, thus, of male and
female identity.
Chestman involved the sale of Waldbaum, Inc., a publicly
traded company that owned a large supermarket chain.'37 Robert
Chestman was a stockbroker who had received material informa-
tion about a pending, non-public change of control of Waldbaum's.'3 S
His informant was Keith Loeb, a son-in-law of the Waldbaum fam-
ily and nephew-in-law of Ira Waldbaum, the president and control-
ling shareholder of Waldbaum." 9 Chestman traded on this infor-
mation.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The misappropriation
theory differs from the traditional insider trading theory in that cases brought under the
traditional theory involve a corporate insider who trades in securities of the firm of which
he is an insider. Thus, the insider is a market participant, as is the firm that issued the
securities. Even if the insider tips someone else who is a friend or family member, the line
between market and family is unlikely to be implicated because there would be no liability
if the tippee did not use the information to trade in the market. Under the traditional theory
of insider trading, all parties are closely tied to the market, a fact which may not be true in
misappropriation cases.
136. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
137. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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Keith Loeb had learned of the information in a rather round-
about way. When Ira Waldbaum decided to sell his interest in the
business, he offered to tender his sister's significantly smaller block
of shares to save her the trouble of tendering after the public
announcement.140 His sister, Keith Loeb's mother-in-law, told her
daughter, Susan Loeb (Keith's wife), about the impending sale,
cautioning her not to tell anyone, except Keith, because it might
ruin the whole agreement. When Susan told Keith of the forthcom-
ing sale of the business, she warned him keep the information con-
fidential. He promptly turned around and told his broker, Chest-
man.
Ultimately, Chestman was convicted of securities fraud for
violating Rule 10b-5. Loeb cooperated with the SEC's prosecution
of Chestman. The Second Circuit, in an en banc opinion, held that
Chestman's liability would depend on whether his source, Keith
Loeb, could be found to have passed on the information in breach of
a fiduciary-type duty owed either to the extended Waldbaum family
or to Keith's wife, Susan.'4 ' Claiming that "[k]inship alone does not
create the necessary relationship," the court found that he had not
breached a duty owed to either.'42 There was no fiduciary duty
owed to the family because they had never discussed confidential
business information with him, the disclosure in this instance did
not serve the interests of Ira Waldbaum or the company, and be-
cause his relationship with the family was not characterized by "in-
fluence or reliance"of any sort.'43
The court focused on a similar absence of 'influence or reliance"
to find, more surprisingly, that Keith had also not breached any
duty to his wife in disclosing the information to Chestman.' 4 The
court specifically distinguished between the breach of a fiduciary
duty necessary for violation of Rule 10b-5 and "normal marital
obligations.""' Violation of the latter, apparently, would not be
sufficient to result in Rule 10b-5 liability. The court found that
Keith had not breached any fiduciary-type duties because he had
never expressly agreed to keep the information confidential, despite
the fact that his wife had explicitly warned him not to tell. The
court was unwilling to imply an agreement to keep the information
confidential because her disclosure to him "served no purpose," "was
140. See id.
141. See id. at 564.
142. Id. at 570.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 571.
145. Id.
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unprompted," and because their relationship was not one of "su-
periority," "reliance," or "dependence." 4 ' In order for a fiduciary-
type duty to exist between two people, the court believed that there
had to be the type of power imbalance implied by these terms. 4" In
short, the court viewed Keith and Susan Loeb's marriage as being
a marriage of autonomous, self-sufficient individuals - a truly
modern marriage.
Unfortunately, the court's claim that there should not be
liability in Chestman because there was no confidential relationship
between Keith and Susan Loeb is belied both by the facts which
show a relationship of dependence and reliance, and by a line of
family law cases which frequently find that marriage creates a
confidential relationship. In the Chestman case itself, the Second
Circuit's opinion is replete with information that would lead one to
believe that Susan Loeb relied on and was dependent on her
husband to act on her behalf in financial matters. 4 ' Keith Loeb
and Robert Chestman first met because, according to the court,
"Loeb decided to consolidate his and his wife's holdings in Wald-
baum."'49 According to the court, it was Keith, not his wife, who
made the decision to consolidate. The facts do not even indicate
that he consulted her before he made the decision. He was the
active one while she was passive and dependent on him. Similarly,
Keith was the one who met with Chestman and it was Keith who
mailed Susan's birth certificate to Chestman when it was re-
quested.160
Over the years, Chestman executed several transactions in
Waldbaum stock '"or Keith Loeb."'' It does not appear that Chest-
man ever met or talked with Susan Loeb. From the court's de-
scription, one could assume that Keith had taken upon himself the
job of dealing with the couple's financial matters, despite the fact
that the Waldbaum money came from Susan's side of the family and
that they jointly owned a large number of shares."l 2 In short, as far
as family finances go, Susan appears to have been completely de-
pendent on Keith and to have relied on him to act in the best in-
terest of both of them. The court's conclusion that she was not
146. Id.
147. See id. at 568-69.
148. See id. at 555.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 579 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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dependent on him for financial management appears ungrounded
in the facts.
While Keith was occupied trying to make money through the
market, Susan was carrying out the traditional wife's role. On the
crucial day in November when Susan's mother went to the bank to
recover her stock certificates and turn them over to Ira Waldbaum,
Susan was busy carpooling the Loeb children around town.'53 She
only learned of the impending Waldbaum sale because she was
concerned that her mother was not home when she tried to call.
Knowing that her mother's health was poor, Susan pursued the
matter, catching her mother at home the next day.154 Susan's
mother told her of the upcoming sale only because Susan, out of
concern for her mother's health, had pursued the matter of where
her mother had been. Finally, Susan spilled the beans to Keith in
the context of a discussion about what the upcoming sale would
mean to their children. 5 Thus, while Keith was engaged in "man-
aging" the family's finances, Susan was driving children around,
worrying about their futures, and fretting over her mother's health.
In short, she was employed in the traditional wifely duties of caring
for children and maintaining the couple's relations with others.
This is not exactly the modern marriage that the court describes.
Susan relied on Keith and was dependent on him, perhaps even
subordinate to him in financial matters. In his communications
with Loeb, he was acting on her behalf, as well as for himself. The
court's conclusion that the relationship was not one of dependence
and reliance comes as something of a surprise to the careful reader
of the opinion.
Equally surprising is the court's conclusion that "marriage does
not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship." '156 To support
this position, the court cited United States v. Reed,'57 an insider
trading case from the Southern District of New York. The Chest-
man court also noted that the Reed court had relied on G.G. Bo-
gert's treatise on Trusts.5 8 These are peculiar sources for the
court's finding that there is no confidential relationship in this case.
In Reed, the court had refused to dismiss the indictment of Reed for
insider trading based on information that he had received from his
father, an insider. Although not a case involving a marriage
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 568.
157. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
158. G.G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (Rev. 2d ed. 1978).
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relation, the Reed court actually found exactly the type of confiden-
tial relationship between father and son that the Chestman court
held not to exist between husband and wife.
Further, Bogert's treatise does not provide strong support for
the Chestman court's position. Bogert does say, as the court quotes,
that "mere kinship does not of itself establish a confidential rela-
tion."'59 But this is preceded by a statement that "[flrequently" the
relationship between the parties is so close in blood or marriage
that "the letting down of all guards and bars is natural" and a court
may find "that a confidential relation existed."6 0 Indeed, the
finding of a confidential relationship is portrayed as the norm in
Bogert's treatise, with exceptions to this norm existing when "rela-
tives are hostile to each other or deal at arms length... and so are
held not to have been in a confidential relation."'' The possible ex-
istence of such hostile relationships prevents Bogert from asserting
that mere kinship alone creates a confidential relationship. Given
the facts of Chestman, one would be inclined to think of Susan and
Keith Loeb's relationship as the type in which all guards are let
down, not one in which the parties were hostile to one another and
dealing at arm's length. It is exactly the type of relationship in
which, applying Bogert's analysis, there should be a finding of a
confidential relationship.
It is also interesting that the Chestman court does not cite to
any of the numerous divorce cases on the question of whether a
confidential relationship exists within marriage. The factual con-
text of these cases is somewhat different from the context of
Chestman, indeed, the parties in a divorce have less reason to be
trusting of each other than Susan and Keith Loeb did. Neverthe-
less, these cases invariably conclude that such duties are owed. 6 '
Most of the cases involve disputes over property that the husband
has tried to claim for his own.'63 One case even involved a commer-
cial relationship in which each spouse owned a company and the
companies had done business with each other.'64 The husband's
business had gone bankrupt, owing money to the wife's firm. She
159. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568 (quoting BOGERT, supra note 158, § 482, at 300-11).
160. BOGERT, supra note 158, § 482, at 298-300.
161. Id. § 482, at 311-319.
162. See Sherry v. Sherry, 722 P.2d 494, 496 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); Cairo v. Cairo, 251
Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Buckner v. Buckner, 815 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1991); Williams v. Waldman, 836 P.2d 614, 618 (Nev. 1992). See also In Re Analytical
Systems, 113 B.R. 91 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
163. See, e.g., Cairo, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (in which the wife signed a quitclaim deed,
along with other documents her husband had presented to her, at her husband's request).164. See In re Analytical Systems, 113 B.R. 91 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
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received a formal notice of the bankruptcy case which included a
notice that creditors who were to be scheduled as disputed must file
by a specified date. Her claim against her husband's business was
for $378,000, but at some point it had been reduced on his books to
$51,000, without informing her. When she received the notice of
the bankruptcy proceeding, she asked him if she had to respond,
and he said she did not need to because her claims were already
scheduled. One would think that given the commercial nature of
their relationship, something akin to caveat emptor would apply.
But the court held that "the confidential relationship between
husband and wife... entitles each to rely upon the representations
of the other."16 According to the court, it was simply too difficult to
disentangle their positions as husband and wife from their commer-
cial relationships.
Given these cases, the lack of support in U.S. v. Reed for the
Chestman court's position, and the facts of the Chestman case, the
court's holding that Keith Loeb was not in a confidential relation-
ship with either the Waldbaum family or his wife, and therefore did
not misappropriate the information, runs contrary to both the facts
and the law. This raises the question of why the court resolved the
Chestman case as it did. Why did the Court work so hard to avoid
liability for Chestman?
I believe the answer to this question is that the court sees the
realms of market and family as diametrically opposed to each other.
The insider trading rules are rules for a market. These rules
should be applied within the setting of the market but not extended
to relationships within the family. In this way, the ideal of family
marks the limits of insider trading law.1" It becomes the boundary
over which the structures of Rule 10b-5 must not leap.
In Chestman, the court tried to determine what, if anything,
represents the limit on Rule 10b-5 liability. It did not recognize the
way in which this limit is tied to the juxtaposition of market and
family. According to Chiarella, there is no duty to disclose or
abstain from trading under Rule 10b-5 without a fiduciary relation-
165. Id. at 94.
166. For a description of the traditional ideal of family, see supra notes 77-88 and
accompanying text. Recently, the Circuit Courts have also articulated this concern for
restricting insider trading law to the market through their emphasis on the requirement that
the deceptive act be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." United States
v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1994). In both Bryan and United States v. OHagan, 117
S. Ct. 2199 (1997), the courts held that there was no violation of the insider trading
prohibition unless there was deception of the purchaser or seller of securities. This narrow
interpretation of the "in connection with" requirement of Bryan ensured that the prohibition
would be applied only in the most routine of market situations.
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ship, or similar relationship of trust and confidence.167 In the
context of the market, the term "fiduciary relationship" is meaning-
ful to the Chestman court: 'Tethered to the field of shareholder re-
lations, fiduciary obligations arise within a narrow, principled
sphere."'" However, the court continued, 'The existence of fidu-
ciary duties in other common law settings . . . is anything but
clear."'6 9 It concluded its analysis of misappropriation theory by
saying it would tread cautiously, "lest our efforts to construe rule
10b-5 lose method and predictability, taking over the 'whole cor-
porate universe."
170
This is a strange fear for the court - the fear that the decision
in Chestman may result in an encompassing of the entire corporate
world. Chestman, after all, is a case that is not so much about the
corporate world as about family relationships. Ira Waldbaum was
willing to tender his sister's shares for her'because it would make
her life easier. Susan Loeb learned of the sale of the family
business only because of her concern for her mother's health. Keith
heard the information from her because she was his wife and
because it would affect their children's financial security. Why then
does the court express its fear that liability in Chestman might
result in Rule 10b-5's taking over the entire corporate universe?
Apparently this is the worst the court can imagine. The possibility
that liability might extend to the world of the family is so extreme
as to be unimaginable. Thus, in a case that does not involve
disclosures within the corporate setting, and in which the court is
adamant about keeping liability from the family setting, it nonethe-
less refers to the worst that could happen as the extension of
liability to the "corporate universe." In this way, family connotes all
that is not the market.
The court itself recognized that there was a huge difference
between the market and the family, and that this difference was
crucial to the outcome in Chestman. At the beginning of its analysis
of liability under Rule 10b-5, the court noted that it had "heretofore
never applied the misappropriation theory ... in the context of
family relationships.' 17' Later it said, 'To date we have applied the
[misappropriation] theory only in the context of employment
167. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
168. 947 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1991).
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 480 (1976) (coining the phrase
"whole corporate universe." Here the court's concern was with the possible expansion of Rule
10b-5 to cover all breaches of corporate fiduciary obligations)).
171. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 564.
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relationships."'72 Its efforts here to distinguish previous misappro-
priation cases indicate its recognition of the significance of the -di-
vide between the realm of market and that of family, and its reluc-
tance to cross that divide.
The Chestman court's recognition of the divide between family
and market is also demonstrated in its willingness to overturn
United States v. Reed,'73 the only previous misappropriation case in
which liability under Rule 10b-5 had been found for disclosures
made within a family setting. Although it did not actually overturn
the case because neither of the parties had requested it to do so, the
court does, on its own initiative, 'limit Reed to its essential hold-
ing."'74 This strong action, again not on the request of either party,
indicates how important it was to the court to state clearly that
liability under Rule 10b-5 did not extend to family settings.
The court's preoccupation with the difficulties of applying the
law of the market to family settings is also revealed by the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions. Both Judge Winter, in dissent, and
Judge Miner, in concurrence, emphasize the differences between
family and market relationships. Judge Winter argues that the
court's approach to liability under Rule 10b-5 is unrealistic in the
requirements it places on family members who do not want their
business-related comments repeated. In order to be protected, they
must extract express promises of confidentiality from one anoth-
er.'75 According to Judge Winter, such a requirement makes no
sense given the informal give and take of a family:
Under such a regime, parents and children must conceal their
comings and goings, family members must cease to speak when
a son-in-law enters a room, and offended members of the family
must understand that such conduct is always related only to
business.176
Indeed, he argued that it would force family members to
"behave like strangers toward each other... [and to] act as if there
172. Id. at 566. Similarly, the court in U.S. v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
is careful to portray a case involving a therapist's breach of a patient's confidential
disclosures as involving the patient's 'inancial investment in psychiatric treatment." Id. at
274. This makes it easier to analogize the case to others involving business relationships and
to de-emphasize the fact that it involves a wife's divulging her husband's plans. The family
aspects of the case can thus be ignored, and the border between market and family retained
intact. See also U.S. v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
173. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
174. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569.
175. See id. at 580 (Winter, J., dissenting in part).
176. Id.
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are no mutual obligations of trust and confidence. ... ,,177 This is
exactly how participants in a market act - as strangers to one
another and with no pre-existing obligations toward each other. In
other words, the crux of Judge Winter's disagreement with the
court's opinion was that the court's approach would force family
members to treat each other as market participants do, thereby
erasing the line between family and market.
Judge Miner concurred in the court's decision in Chestman and,
like Judge Winter, he was overtly concerned that any decision other
than the one he supported might wreak havoc with his understand-
ing of how families work. He, like Judge Winter, wanted to retain
the informal way in which family members react to one another.
He wondered, "How could family news be disseminated freely in an
atmosphere where the members must be ultra-sensitive to whether
'both the corporation and the family' are seeking some measure of
confidentiality 'under the circumstances.""78 He too focused on the
affective life of the family, voicing his concern that if the court were
to decide differently, family members would never again reveal
secrets to others. 179 The result would be that family relations would
begin to mimic those of the market: isolated and autonomous. This
is a result to be feared and avoided.
Judge Miner's image of the family took for granted that family
relationships are fundamentally different from market relation-
ships. Given family members' strong emotional ties to one another,
and given their informal modes of interacting, he believed it made
"little sense ... to imply assurances that confidentiality would be
maintained."'' ° The courts treat market relations differently.
There, they have been perfectly willing to imply such assurances.
In the Dirks case, the Supreme Court fictitiously created fiduciary
relations for Rule 10b-5 purposes between various kinds of business
professionals (such as accountants or lawyers) and shareholders. 8'
The Dirks Court' imposed a fiduciary duty on these professionals
who otherwise, barring contractual restrictions, would have been
free to disclose whatever tidbits they had gleaned. It is not clear
whether the Court imposed these obligations because it was
concerned about the continuing relationship between the parties
involved or about undermining their informal modes of interacting.
Either of these could be important in situations involving accoun-
177. Id.
178. Id. at 582 (Miner, J., concurring).
179. See id.
180. Id. at 583.
181. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
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tants or lawyers who have frequent repeat dealings with the same
opposing parties."2 Regardless of the Court's rationale in Dirks, it
is surprising that Judge Miner rejects the idea of imposing obliga-
tions of confidentiality with so little discussion in the context of
families.
Judge Miner's reluctance to "imply assurances of confidential-
ity" within the family structure and the Dirks Court's contrasting
willingness to do so between professionals shows that the interac-
tions within the family were seen as fundamentally different from
those within the market. In the family, according to Judge Miner,
confidences are to be exchanged freely, but keeping them depends
on the parties' relations to each other. In the market, confidences
may be exchanged, but confidentiality is not expected volunarily.
It must be enforced through legal sanctions. In contrast, his
position could also be interpreted as implying that relationships
within the family are too important (or too fragile) to risk legal
intervention. 183
Thus, the opinions in the Chestman case indicate two impor-
tant ways in which ideas about family continue to influence the
development of Rule 10b-5. First, family establishes a border to the
market, and thereby to the reach of Rule 10b-5. This is not because
families never engage in market transactions. Of course they do,
and Chestman is an example of family members relating to each
other and the market simultaneously. Rather, my point is that
ideals of families and markets as two oppositional types affect our
thoughts and beliefs about such seemingly irrelevant subjects as
the reach of Rule 10b-5.
Second, the opinions in Chestman also show the differing
characteristics that we assign to families and markets. Markets
are characterized by relations among strangers who do not owe
each other duties while families are the seats of our emotional lives.
It is appropriate to act differently in each of these different settings.
As Miner's and Winter's opinions demonstrate, the law is struc-
tured to accommodate and facilitate these different ways of acting
by assigning each to its appropriate realm.
182. For a discussion of the importance of continuing relationships in contract law, see
Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565 (describing the work of Stewart Macauley and Ian Macneil).
183. The Court's failure to intervene to enforce Susan Loeb's injunction to secrecy is a
form of governmental action. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the
Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985) (discussing varieties of means through which
a state intervenes in the family).
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The line between family and market does not exist in a firm,
unchanging manner. Instead, it is constantly being recreated. The
courts are part of this definitional process. In Chestman, the court
found no liability under Rule 10b-5 because the duties, if there were
any, that family members owed to one another were not the type of
duties on which one could build an insider trading case. Reviewing
a series of cases will help to identify the current definitions of
family and market.
One of the few cases that, like Chestman, involves a discussion
of family, is SEC v. Switzer."4 In Switzer, a corporate executive
was overheard at a track meet talking to his wife about an out of
town meeting to discuss the possibility of liquidating or otherwise
disposing of a corporate subsidiary. The evesdropper, Switzer, then
traded on the information that he had heard, and spread the good
word to some of his friends. The court held that the defendants had
not engaged in insider trading. Rule 10b-5 would be violated only
if a corporate insider had passed on the information in breach of a
fiduciary duty, including benefitting pecuniarily from the tip.
According to the court, the executive, George Platt, had not
breached a duty in relaying to his wife the information that he was
considering liquidating the company."8 5
Instead, the court saw the discussion of this corporate news as
relevant to Platt's family. His wife would be leaving town for a
week the day after their discussion and they needed to discuss their
family's plans for that week. Since they had children, it was their
practice to try to arrange for one parent to be in town while the
other was away."8 In this way, passing the information on to his
wife takes on the coloring of "family" instead of business. Similarly,
the court describes the conversation between husband and wife as
one in which she is performing as a good wife, solicitous of his
mental health:
[Wlhen G. Platt appears distracted, it is not uncommon for his
wife to inquire of him what is on his mind. On these occasions,
he will talk to her about his problems, even though she does not
184. 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
185. See id. at 766. In terms of insider trading law, the case could have gone either way.
The court could have found Platt to have breached a duty to Phoenix, the company to be sold
or liquidated, by intentionally telling his wife the corporate news in a setting in which he
could easily be overheard. He himself benefitted from the disclosure, as the court itself
notes, by having the opportunity to talk to his wife about an issue that had been disturbing
him. The benefit derived from the breach of the fiduciary duty need not be pecuniary. See
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (stating that the benefit may be reputational or a gift to another).
186. See Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 762.
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have an understanding of nor interest in business matters. On
the day of the track meet, Phoenix [the corporation in question]
was weighing upon the mind of G. Platt... prompting G. Platt
to talk to his wife about it.is7
Here, she is described as the caring wife of -separate spheres
ideology. It is her job to provide solace and comfort to her husband
as he deals with the troubles of the world. The interaction between
husband and wife is thus placed squarely in the realm of family.
Indeed, both Chestman and Switzer depict the relationships
between spouses as focused primarily on family, not business,
issues.
Yet, in other cases where familial relationships are involved,
the courts have been more likely to see the issues as relating to
business instead of family. U.S. v. Reed18 s involved a discussion
between father and son of the affairs of a corporation of which the
father was the chief executive. The son then traded on the informa-
tion that he had learned. The court permitted the insider trading
suit to go forward against the son. This case could have been
understood in a manner very similar to Switzer since the father was
relieving his own pent-up anxiety by discussing a troublesome
business situation with his son. Gordon Reed, the father, was
known to discuss his business problems regularly with his son,'8 9
not unlike the discussions that G. Platt had with his wife.
The Reed court, however, did not portray the situation as
involving therapeutic familial interactions. Instead, it categorized
the relationship as a business one. Although it said that the father-
son relationship was "particularly close," it also described them as
having frequently discussed business affairs in an, atmosphere in
which it was understood that the son would respect the father's
confidences. 90 In fact, the SEC had initially alleged that the
business confidences passed both ways, creating an image of the
two advising each other on business.'9 ' To further emphasize the
business aspects of the relationship, the Chestman court retrospec-
tively limited Reed "to its essential holding: the repeated disclosure
187. Id. Consistent with her subordinate position under separate spheres ideology, the
court referred to Mrs. Platt either by her role - wife - or by her given name, Linda. She
is not called either Mrs. Platt or L. Platt, despite the fact that her husband is always (with
only one exception) called G. Platt.
188. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
189. See id. at 690.
190. Id. This could also have been said about George Platt and his wife, Linda. See supra
text accompanying notes 186-88.
191. See Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 690 n.6. This claim was ultimately dropped.
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of business secrets between family members .... .192 The business
aspects of the relationship in Reed were crucial to the Chestman
court's understanding of it.
In contrast to Switzer, the Court treated Gordon Reed as if he
had been using his son as a business consultant, not as an emo-
tional therapist. This characterization was furthered by the Reed
court's description of the son as the president of a family-owned
land development company.'93 This placed him squarely within the
business world. We never learn what type of business Mrs. Platt
was involved in, although it is unlikely that she was a full-time
housewife. The Switzer court's failure to describe her outside
interests made it easier to see her as a confidant, wife, and mother,
and harder to view her as a business consultant. Similarly, the
Chestman court's discussion of Susan Loeb left the impression that
she was a full-time homemaker - certainly not a person likely to
serve her husband as a consultant on the purchase of shares of
stock.
Another case that falls on the business side of the line is
Aschinger v. Columbus Showcase Co."' This involved two brothers,
each of whom had separately sold his shares back to the corporation
when he retired. The defendant, Carl Sr., received a significantly
higher price for his shares and, as Chairman of the Board, was also
responsible for the negotiations on the corporation's behalf with the
plaintiff, Ralph. Ralph claimed that the defendant had superior
knowledge as to the shares' value at the time that the buy-back of
Ralph's shares was occurring. The court found that the defendant
did not breach any fiduciary duties that were owed to Ralph. It
described Ralph as an active participant in the business of the
corporation, a director, and the family member in charge of labor
negotiations.'95 As a result, it found that Carl Sr. had not violated
Rule 10b-5. Aschinger viewed the brothers in terms of their
business relationship and not in terms of their family relations.
Why is it that some cases involving family members are seen
as outside of the scope of Rule 10b-5 while others are seen as
subject to the demands of the rule? A review of the cases indicates
that this may be because the courts conceive of family as involving
heterosexual, marital relations. Cases like Chestman and Switzer
are seen as involving this core familial relationship, whereas
Aschinger and Reed do not. Relations between brothers, or between
192. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991).
193. See Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 690-91.
194. 934 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1991).
195. See id. at 1408.
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fathers and sons, can more easily be characterized as market
relations, in part, simply because they involve men.' According to
the separate spheres ideology, the market is a male venue. Thus,
the cases that involve the transfer of business information between
men are more easily seen as involving market relations than those
that involve the transfer of information among members of a
heterosexual couple. Or, to phrase the point differently, relations
between men and women are understood as predicated on an
underlying sexual attraction and emotional attachment. These are
characteristics associated with the family. Thus, in deciding insider
trading cases, the courts are necessarily defining the market's
opposite: the family. Family, according to these cases, involves
traditional marital relations. Other relations are easily character-
ized as business, even when they involve members of the same
family.1
97
This is further illustrated by the way the courts have handled
cases that involve close friendships or other close personal relation-
ships. These cases sit uneasily in the area between what would be
colloquially considered family and what would be thought of as the
market. Although these cases often involve family-type relation-
ships in which the parties could each be expected to look out
altruistically for the other's interests, the courts rarely categorize
them as involving relationships on the family side of the line.
Perhaps this is because they do not involve heterosexual relations,
and thus it is harder for the courts to conceive of them as involving
truly close personal relations.'9" Instead, the relations in these
cases are usually viewed as market relations.
For example, in one such case, SEC v.Tome, 99 in which the
parties and their wives had spent numerous weekends at each
196. But see SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding no violation of Rule
lOb-5 between a father and son). In this case, in which a broker-son was alleged to have
tipped his father to inside information, the court noted that a crucial 43 minute conversation
between the father and son may simply have involved a party that the parents wanted to
hold and to which they wanted to invite their son and his then fiancee. See id. at 880. The
court's willingness in this situation to recognize that the conversation may have stemmed
from a familial relationship distinct from the market contrasts with both Aschinger and
Reed.
197. See also, SEC v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL (EEX), 1992 WL 301398 (C.D. Cal
July 28, 1992) (regarding a female employee who tipped her aunt and was found liable for
violating Rule 10b-5).
198. In many of these cases, the courts reinterpret the gifts and open flow of information
that characterize the close relationships as a desire for individual, personal gain. See supra
text accompanying notes 190-92. Once reinterpreted in this way, they fit within Dirks's
requirements for trading in violation of Rule 10b-5.
199. 638 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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other's homes, on each other's boats, and at one another's vacation
houses, the male tipper openly expressed his affection for the male
tippee. After the SEC began investigating, the tipper asked his
wife to telephone the tippee's wife to say, "Don't worry. We love you
.... The reason Edgar's not calling you is because he's being
advised not to. But he still loves you."2" In another case, SEC v.
Singer,201 the court described the personal relationship between the
tipper and tippee as a "very close personal friendship:"
The two communicated many times a week, in person, by phone,
or by fax, and socialized together approximately every quarter
even though the two lived in different cities .... McLearnon
[the tipper] characterized their relationship as so close that
there was a "stream of consciousness ....
Despite these statements revealing the clear personal warmth that
existed between the men in both these cases, the courts found that
insider trading had occurred. The courts did not characterize these
relationships as existing on the family side of the line but, rather,
as set within the market.
In Singer, the court emphasized the business side of the par-
ties' relationship. In describing the connections between the two
men, it referred first to the fact that an attorney-client relationship
existed between them. °" Its initial description of the defendant is
as a "deal lawyer" for the tipper's firm.2" Next it discussed the de-
fendant's work on the tipper's personal legal matters. 5 This is still
a description of a business relationship. Only after it had empha-
sized their professional relationship by putting it first did the court
discuss the personal relationship between the two of them.2" Even
in the paragraph describing the depth of their personal relation-
ship, the court referred repeatedly to the fact that the tipper relied
on the defendant in connection with "business matters" and that
they communicated on business matters several times a week.20 7 In
this way, the court made clear that it viewed their relationship as
one that existed within the world of the market, not the world of
family.
200. Id. at 614.
201. 786 F. Supp 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
202. Id. at 1161.
203. See id. at 1170.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 1169.
207. See id. at 1170.
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Similarly, in Tome, the case in which the tipper expressed his
"love" for the tippee and his wife, the court emphasized the business
aspects of the relationship. It described the relationship as one in
which the tipper, Bronfman, "considered [the tippee] sort of a
European consultant to Seagram [the tipper's firm] generally,"208
and an "advisor [for] general business purposes." 9 The court em-
phasized their business relationship by noting that the two men
also undertook to be joint venturers in one investment. 1 ° Finally,
the court related the fact that Bronfman gave the tippee, Tome, a
power of attorney and discretion over Bronfman's own personal ac-
count."1' This served to emphasize their business relations. Al-
though Bronfman appears to have been fond of Tome, the court den-
igrated the friendship. It described the Tomes as having promptly
"ingratiated" themselves to the Bronfmans, and as having "cal-
lously" taken "shoddy" advantage of the Bronfmans' friend-ship.
21 2
Again, the court placed a relationship involving significant affection
within the realm of the market.
Cases can also sit in the netherland between family and market
for other reasons. In United States v. Willis,2 1 a psychiatrist traded
on inside information obtained from a patient. The information
concerned the patient's husband's possible move to become CEO of
BankAmerica. Needless to say, this is not a case involving a family
relationship between the patient and her therapist. On the other
hand, the confidential relationship between a patient and therapist
can be very close to the ideal relationship between family members.
As the court says, "It is difficult to imagine a relationship that
requires a higher degree of trust and confidence than the tradi-
tional relationship of physician and patient."2"
Despite this, the court emphasized the business aspects of the
doctor-patient relationship. It focused on the business relationship
between the patient and Dr. Willis, not on whatever personal or
therapeutic ties may have existed between them. In discussing the
208. SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
209. Id. at 604.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 602-03.
213. 778 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("villis Ir).
214. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Willis r). Dr. Willis,
the defendant, had even argued that his case did not fit easily within the normal conception
of the market. He would have categorized cases by whether or not the patient was a member
of the corporate world. See id. at 274. Subsequently, he argued that Chestman limited the
misappropriation theory to fiduciary relationships within the securities markets. See Willis
II, 778 F. Supp. at 208. This was a clear effort to put the doctor-patient relationship on the
side of family instead of market.
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damage that occurred as a result of Dr. Willis' trading, the court
described the economic damage to the relationship, as opposed to a
rupture in the personal relationship or damage to the patient's
psyche. 15 The doctor's disclosure and trading on the inside infor-
mation is not considered injurious because the trust developed dur-
ing the course of treatment has been destroyed, but rather because
of the economic injury that might occur to the patient as a result of
the disclosure of the information. The patient's husband's advance-
ment might be jeopardized, the therapeutic relationship might need
to be terminated, she might need to expend more money to find a
new doctor, or the treatment time might be prolonged and costs
thereby increased by the need to discuss the disclosures. 16 The
court is concerned here with the economic relationship between the
patient and her doctor. This emphasis places the case on the mar-
ket side of the family-market divide.
These cases, involving brothers, father and son, or therapist
and patient, could have been interpreted as implicating either the
closest relations outside of the market - family - or as focusing on
the economic connections between the participants. In placing
them within the market, the courts are defining both market and
family. Market relations focus on economic concerns and take place
between parties who are not invoking the personal ties between
them. Family relations, in contrast, provide a respite from these
topics. They involve a woman whose role is to perform wifely
functions. Family relations are not those between brothers,
between father and son, or between therapist and patient. Family,
as it is defined by insider trading law, means only the relations
between a couple in a heterosexual marriage.
.Equally important, the courts' decisions leave no room between
the realms of market and family. This leaves the dichotomy intact,
and with it the privileged position of the market vis-a-vis the
family. Undermining this dichotomy might undermine the pre-
ferred position of the market in our social lives. Market labbr is
compensated while labor within the family is not.21 7 Occupations
involving the types of work traditionally associated with the family
- nursing, teaching, cleaning - tend to be low paying. Even
within the legal profession, family law is usually lower compensated
215. See Willis I, 737 F. Supp. at 274.
216. See id.
217. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996)
(describing how the law treats women's work at home as not value-producing); Reva B.
Siegel, Home as Work, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (noting that nineteenth-century women
struggled for the recognition of property rights in household labor).
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and accorded less status than corporate law.218 Furthermore, it is
the corporate world, not the world of the family, that is influential
in politics. Maintaining the line between market and family is
essential to the maintenance of this privileged position. For this
purpose, it is not essential that there be equal numbers of cases on
either side of the line. Subsuming cases like Tome, Singer, and
Willis under the rubric of market will not weaken the "market"
category. All that matters is that there is a realm, however small,
on the other side. Family must continue to be separately delineated
in order for the market to remain a privileged concept and practice.
IV. THE GENDERING OF EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNEss
The last section showed the way in which the courts, in
deciding insider trading cases, divide the world into two opposing
territories, family and market, with no space in between. This
section will demonstrate the role these two gendered ideals play in
the effort to identify a primary purpose for the insider trading
prohibition. As has already been noted, some commentators believe
the prohibition is necessary in order to ensure market efficiency.219
Others argue that the prohibition is not aimed at efficiency but,
rather, is a means of producing fairness among traders.20 The
Supreme Court in Dirks specifically rejected a fairness basis for the
rule against insider trading,2 ' evinced some interest in the concept
of efficiency, 2 and focused on doctrine.22 The Court has clearly
218. See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 97 (1994) (stating that divorce law
is held in generally low regard); CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, WOMAN'S PLACE 164 (1970) (noting that
matrimonial law is often not considered "real law"); CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 381
(2d ed. 1993) (documenting that the material rewards and professional prestige of family law
practice are low); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social
Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 429 (1996) (recognizing the anti-family law attitudes
of large law firms).
219. See, e.g., Corgill, supra note 23; Georgakopoulos, supra note 23; Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 23. But see Stout, supra note 23 (concluding that efficiency is not a goal worth
nurturing).
220. See Brudney, supra note 25; Scheppele, supra note 25; Schotland, supra note 25.
221. See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983) (rejecting the SEC's theory that the "antifraud
provisions require equal information among all traders"). But cf. United States v. O'Hagan,
117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (recognizing that insider trading law is aimed at preventing deceptive
trading).
222. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 n.17.
223. See id. at 660-68 (discussing when an insider can be held liable for having breached
his fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation). See also Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (explaing that a duty to disclose arises when one party has
information that the other party is entitled to know "because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 551(2)(a) (1976)).
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stated that a determining element in deciding whether insider
trading is prohibited is the relationship between either the trader
or tipper and the shareholders of the firm whose shares were
traded, or the relationship between the source of the information
and the trader.224
Thus, whether such a relationship exists has become a crucial
question in insider trading cases. Focusing on relationships in the
market context is an anomoly. We usually associate relationships
with our families and personal lives instead of with the arm's
length interactions we have with others in the market. Why have
the courts chosen the concept of a relationship to serve such a
crucial function instead of relying on a more market-compatible
concept, such as the more limited "fiduciary"? It turns out that a
relationship is important because it draws our attention to it and
away from the underlying conflict between the market norms of
efficiency and equality.225
Equality, in this context, means equal access to material
information226 and is often referred to as "fairness."'227 Other
components of the market norm of participant equality are the
individuals' autonomy from one another, with no one subordinated
to another. Only under these circumstances will they be able to
trade freely and voluntarily. 28 The legitimacy of market transac-
tions depends on the assumption that the parties have freely and
voluntarily agreed. Furthermore, in an ideal market, participants
are equal price-takers from the market.229 No one's position is
superior to anyone else's. Advocates of fairness as the fundamental
value behind the insider trading prohibition believe that the law
224. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228; O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
225. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (elaborating on efficiency and equality
as market-associated norms).
226. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 252 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling insider trading
"inherently unfair"); Scheppele, supra note 25, at 125 (equating equal access to information
with fairness); Patricia H. Werhane, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 841, 844
(1989) (viewing insiders as having unfair advantages over traders who do not have inside
information).
227. See Scheppele, supra note 25, at 125 (using the word "fair" to refer to informational
equality).
228. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (explaing that utilitarians count each individual as one util);
POSNER, supra note 51, at 11 (noting that efficiency can only be determined by willingness
to pay, which in turn can only be determined by observing voluntary transactions).
229. See William H. Beaver, The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATION LAw AND SECURITIES REGULATION 317, 328-29 (Richard A. Posner & Kenneth
E. Scott eds., 1980); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413,
1443 (1992) (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980)).
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should put traders in positions of informational equality vis-a-vis
other traders.3 °
Advocates of the goal of efficiency see the market as an
allocational tool.2 ' The market will not be efficient, however, if
there are no informational differentials to produce incentives to
discover information. If market participants cannot capitalize on
informational advantages, they will have no reason to locate the
new information and bring it to the market's attention. Unequal
access to information and the inequalities it produces are thus
central to the idea of an efficient market.2" 2 Unfortunately, the
ideal of equality and the possibility of informational advantage
conflict with each other. As Boyle's paradox states, 'To postulate
efficiency in the production of information we must assume away
the incentive necessary to produce. To postulate the incentive is to
make efficiency impossible. 233
These goals - fairness and efficiency - are gendered, with
fairness being "female," and efficiency being "male." Efficiency is
connected to men by its protective function toward the rest of the
market. "Informed traders," Frank Easterbrook argues, "protect
the uninformed. Because the price is set by the knowledgeable, it
is quite safe to buy stock in ignorance. ' 234  A similar protective
function is traditionally associated with men. It is their role to
protect their wives and children from harm.
230. See Scheppele, supra note 25, at 125 (equating equal access to information with
fairness).
231. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Modek A Recipe For
the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373 (1984) (arguing that insider trading law should
adopt the market concept of materiality to ensure a more efficient market); Jeffrey N. Gordon
& Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 781 (1985) (noting that it is highly desirable for markets to be
allocationally efficient); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law
Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1119 (1985) (stating that a disclosure
or abstention rule encourages rapid dissemination of information and, thus, allocational
efficiency).
232. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (recognizing that market analysts and their
ability to trade on information that is not widely available play a crucial role in creating
efficient markets); MANNE, supra note 110 (arguing that insider trading should not be
regulated because it will create a more efficient market); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 228, at 256-57 (stating that insider trading may function as a signal to the market,
increasing efficiency by moving market prices closer to what they would be with full
information); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 112 (arguing for deregulation of insider trading
to allow informational disparities to increase the market's efficiency).
233. Boyle, supra note 229, at 1444. See also id. at 1490 (describing the conflict as a
"choice between an equal access view and a quasi-property rights view").
234. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309, 329-30. See also Hsiu-kwang Wu, An
Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
260, 269 (1968) (concluding that efficiency is the best protection for investors).
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Fairness is connected to women. It is women, not men, who are
thought to be the keepers of morality in our society, and "fairness"
is a moral concept.2"5 When Henry Manne wanted to emphasize the
moral indigation that some people feel at the thought that insider
trading could be legalized, he used the comment of a female
student. According to him, she "stamped her foot and angrily de-
claimed, 'I don't care; it's just not right."'23 Use of a woman stu-
dent's comment focuses attention on the connection between fair-
ness arguments about insider trading law and women. It reaffirms
the genderization of this claim. Finally, fairness arguments are
also connected to women through the frequent accusation that such
arguments involve "fuzzy" thinking.2"7 This is a charge that has
often been leveled at women's moral thinking, which some argue
does not use a hierarchical set of rules in the ways that men's moral
thinking, does.23 ' Thus, calling fairness and equality arguments
"fuzzy" tightens the associations between this type of argument and
women.
The effect of this gendering of the arguments for efficiency and
equality is twofold. First, we expect the two values to be in opposi-
tion to each other, with no room in between. One is, after all, gen-
erally believed to be either a man or a woman; one cannot be both,
nor is there ideologically a third position.239 Second, the gendering
of these values means that in any struggle between the two, we
automatically expect the "male" position to triumph. We are there-
fore predisposed to accept efficiency over fairness as the prevailing
value.24° And, of course, in both Chiarella and Dirks, that is exactly
235. See Dailey, supra note 77, at 967 (recognizing that nineteenth-century women were
seen as having a special role in the preservation of moral values). See also Anne C. Dailey,
Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1827 (1995) (noting that the domestic
sphere is recognized as site for the formation of values).
In contrast, economists concerned with efficiency do not make any special claims as to
efficiency's connection with ethics or morality. See, e.g., Harry Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule
14e-3 and Dirks, 37 Bus. LAW. 517, 531 (1982); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
LAW 4-5 (1973).
236. MANNE, supra note 110, at 233 n.42, quoted in Scheppele, supra note 25, at 123.
237. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 10
(1984) (describing fairness claims as "vague and ill-formed'); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 228, at 261-62 (ridiculing fairness arguments as illogical); Scheppele, supra note 25, at
123 (decrying the charges of fuzziness that have plagued insider trading fairness arguments).
238. See GILLIGAN, supra note 70.
239. Much of postmodern thought is aimed at deconstructing exactly this dichotomy. See
BUrLER, supra note 32, at 137-41 (showing that repeated gender performances through drag
challenge ideas about gender); EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET
(1990) (deconstructing the hetero-homosexual dichotomy).
240. See Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1032
(1992) (explaining that the hierarchical nature of gender relations illuminates other debates).
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what happens. Recognizing the gendered nature of the ideas of
efficiency and fairness simply makes the triumph of efficiency over
fairness appear natural and less objectionable.
The tension between equality and efficiency is further mini-
mized by the emphasis that the courts have placed on the idea of
"relationship" in the law of insider trading. Relationships are
usually associated with family and not with markets where
individuals generally do not owe duties to others.241 Yet, according
to the Supreme Court in Dirks and Chiarella, the insider trading
prohibition applies only if the trader used the information in breach
of a fiduciary duty, or other similar relationship, owed to the
corporation in whose shares he traded or to the source of the
information.242 This formulation of the doctrine of insider trading
has spawned a tremendous amount of litigation and discussion as
to what counts as a "relationship." By focusing our attention in this
way on relationships and through them on ideas about family that
are clearly external to the market, we have avoided the need to
define what type of market we want and what role insider trading
law will play in the realization of that market.
The SEC first recognized insider trading as illegal in 1961 in
the Cady, Roberts decision. 243 That case involved a broker who
learned from a colleague and corporate board member of Curtiss-
Wright that it was going to reduce its dividend. The news had not
yet been made public. The broker, in response to the non-public
news, immediately sold shares for his discretionary accounts. The
SEC found that this violated Rule 10b-5. 44 It held that before trad-
ing, insiders have a duty to disclose material facts which are known
to them because of their positions and which the outsiders do not
know, but which would affect the outsiders' investment decisions.245
Unfortunately, the SEC's opinion did little to define under what
241. See the discussion of the characteristics of family, supra notes 77-88 and
accompanying text. See also Scheppele, supra note 25, at 138 (recognizing that the
development of anonymous markets makes the development of "regular and permanent"
relationships unlikely).
242. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) ("[Ihe duty to disclose arises
when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.") (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983)
("We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to disclose where the
person who has traded on inside information 'was not.., a fiduciary, [or] was not a person
in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.") (citation
omitted).
243. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
244. See id. at 911.
245. See id.
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circumstances people with material, non-public knowledge must
either disclose their knowledge or refrain from trading.
Initially, the SEC stated that the obligation derived from:
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone,
and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.24
This encouraged those analyzing the opinion to think in terms of a
theory of equality - that is to say that the obligation to refrain
from trading devolved on an insider if he had information that the
outsider did not have. In short, the Cady, Roberts case could easily
be interpreted as creating liability for trading on unequal informa-
tion.247 To allow some people to trade on material information that
is not available to others would create a point of inequality that is
inconsistent with the equality-based fairness ideal of the market.
This flaw could be remedied through insider trading laws either by
requiring the sharing of the information or by prohibiting those
possessing the information from trading on it.
This emphasis on equality was not without its problems,
however, since, if followed through to the fullest, it could create
efficiency problems. A prohibition on trading on unequal informa-
tion, if rigorously enforced, might destroy the market.248 In part for
this reason, the equal information standard249 was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC,25 when it held that there was no
violation of the insider trading prohibition unless the trader had
breached a fiduciary duty.2"' Subsequent cases broadened the idea
of duty to include relationships of trust and confidence.5 2 Such a
relationship usually evokes images of connection, bonds, depend-
ence, and family. A focus on relationship could be expected to
eliminate any need to resolve the potential conflict between equality
246. Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
247. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (basing the
insider trading prohibition on the objective of ensuring traders "relatively equal access to
material information").
248. See supra notes 22-23, 231-32 and accompanying text.
249. See also Brudney, supra note 25 (proposing that equal access to information, not
equal information, should be the principle behind insider trading law).
250. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). The Court also rejected the equal information standard in
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
251. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991).
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and efficiency by deflecting attention from the structure of the
market itself to the nature of the relationship required to invoke
the insider trading prohibition.25
Courts repeatedly restate the Chiarella and Dirks requirement
that there must be a relationship between the inside trader and the
firm in whose shares he is trading, thus establishing this as a
critical element of an insider trading case. However, given the
inherent tension between the ideal market with its autonomous
actors and the required relationship with its family connotations,
it is not surprising that they have tended to gloss over any articula-
tion of what counts for the establishment of such a relationship.
This trend began in the Dirks case itself with its famous footnote
fourteen which describes how someone without a previously
existing relationship to the shareholders of the firm in whose shares
he is trading could be considered an "insider" with a fiduciary duty
under Rule 10b-5. The Court said,
Under certain circumstances ... [the] outsiders may become
fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this
fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired
nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have
entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to informa-
tion solely for corporate purposes .... For such a duty to be
imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to
keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the
relationship at least must imply such a duty.254
Thus, it would appear from this that in order for an "outsider"
to become an insider under footnote fourteen, four conditions must
be satisfied. He must have entered into a "special confidential
relationship" concerning the "conduct" of the business; he must
have been given access to the information "solely" for corporate
reasons; he must be expected to keep the information confidential;
and, the relationship must imply a duty to do so. The first and last
of these requirements relate to the needed relationship, but neither
describes it in any detail. Footnote fourteen leaves it to subsequent
cases to do so. .
Nevertheless, subsequent cases have not done so. For example,
in SEC v. Maio, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment against
253. See Olsen, supra note 45 (describing how strategies for reforming the market often
involve ideas associated with the ideal of family).
254. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
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tippees of a corporation's president.255 The court does not discuss
what makes a corporate president an insider but, rather, simply
takes for granted that he is. Although most people would expect a
corporate president to be considered an insider, it would have been
helpful if the court had identified the factors that made him so.
25 6
Instead the Maio court made liability dependent on the purpose of
the disclosure. The purpose was considered inappropriate if cor-
porate information was used for personal reasons: 'This test re-
flects the purpose of insider trading rules, which is to prevent the
use of inside information for personal advantage.""2 7
In discussing purpose, the court was responding to the Dirks
rule that tipping is in breach of a fiduciary duty only if it is for the
tipper's personal benefit. In Dirks, this investigation of personal
benefit is not supposed to occur in the place of a consideration of the
nature of the underlying relationship but should, rather, supple-
ment it. Despite the Supreme Court's mandate that the ethics of a
relationship are crucial to liability under Rule 10b-5, the court in
Maio did not undertake any such discussion.
Furthermore, in several cases in which the trader or source of
the tip serves as a consultant to the firm, the courts are quick to
assume that this is also an "insider's" position. In SEC v. Gas-
par,"8 the court found that an employee of a brokerage firm
negotiating on behalf of an acquiring firm had become a "temporary
insider" merely by virtue of the expectation that he would keep
confidential the corporate information that he had acquired.259 In
doing so, the court's analysis satisfied two of the Dirks require-
ments: he was given the information for corporate reasons, and he
was expected to keep it confidential. The Gaspar court never
255. 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
256. For example, one could imagine the president of a closely-held corporation who had
been frozen out of power, but retained the title. If she overheard and traded on nonpublic
information derived from two shareholders who were currently part of the majority, would
she have violated the insider trading rules?
257. Maio, 51 F.3d at 632.
258. SEC v. Gaspar, No. 83 Civ. 3037, 1985,WL 521 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1985). See also
SEC v. Downe, No. 92 Civ. 4092, 1993 WL 22126 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1993) (alleging that the
defendant, the leader of a potential investor group, acted in breach'of his fiduciary duties to
the corporation, which is sufficient without any discussion of the derivation of the fiduciary
duty); SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437 (C.D. Calif. 1988) (regarding the defendant, a
broker, who located a merger partner for a firm in whose shares he traded). In Ingram, the
court does note three facts which evidence a special relationship between Ingram and the
firm, but the court does not say why these facts create a special relationship. See id. at 1440.
259. See Gaspar, 1985 WL 521, at *16.
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considered whether there was a "special confidential relationship"
or whether the relationship, by its nature, "impl[ied] ... a duty."' 6°
Similarly, in SEC v. Lund,26' the court found Lund to be a
temporary insider based on the Dirks footnote fourteen. Lund was
a friend of Horowitz, the chief executive of P&F, a corporation in
whose shares Lund ultimately traded. Horowitz had given Lund
inside information in hope of inducing him to invest in P&F. In
holding the defendant liable, the court noted that Horowitz and
Lund were "long time friends and business associates" and that
Horowitz told Lund of the investment possibility "because of this
special relationship." '262 It went on to say, 'The information was
made available to Lund solely for corporate purposes. It was not
disclosed in idle conversation or for some other purpose." '263 The
court also noted that Horowitz expected the information to be kept
confidential.264 The court here covered the same two of the four
bases established in the Dirks footnote that the Gaspar court did.
Again, the court did not show that there was a "special confidential
relationship" concerning the "conduct" of the business or that such
a relationship with the business implied a duty to keep the in-
formation confidential. In short, the court confused Lund's personal
relationship with Horowitz with the required relationship between
Lund and the business.' The result is that the court managed to
find Lund liable without elaborating at all on his relationship with
the business.
Despite the Supreme Court's effort to make the presence of a
"special relationship" the critical factor in determining whether
there is insider trading, the lower courts have focused their
attention elsewhere. As the above cases show, they have empha-
sized the expectation of confidentiality that accompanied the
delivery of the information. This means that, although the Su-
preme Court tried to eliminate "equality of information" as an issue
260. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
261. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
262. Id. at 1403.
263. Id.
264. See id. See also Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437 (noting that the firm's president expected
the merger consultant to keep negotiations confidential).
265. It is understandable that this confusion should occur because the underlying theory
is that a trader can trade on inside information to his heart's content, consistently with the
norms of the market, unless there is a relationship. Once there is a relationship, one
automatically thinks in terms of the family in which the norms include caring for one
another. Not surprisingly, the court, in thinking about relationships and duties to others,
thought in terms of family and friends, instead of thinking in terms of the market in which
duties are not normally owed. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 299-302 (explaining that
a personal relationship does not create a duty).
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in insider trading cases, the idea has reentered the analysis
through the back door with the concept of confidentiality. If the
information is to be kept confidential, if others' access to it is
restricted, then there is a violation of the insider trading law if one
trades on it. In this way, the requirement of a relationship silently
reinstates the norm of trader equality. Without saying so, this
requirement recognizes the importance of at least one form of
equality of access to information. In doing so, it reinforces the
importance of the female-associated norm of equality. Thus, this
requirement, which originally appeared to take the focus off of the
tension between the norms of equality and efficiency, now serves as
a surrogate for reinforcing the importance of equality of information
as a standard.
Similarly, it turns out that equal access to information becomes
a crucial concept in cases in which a shareholder in a closely held
corporation wants to sell shares back to the corporation. In
Aschinger v. Columbus Showcase Co., 266 plaintiff and defendant
were the two surviving members of the second generation of a
family that owned the company. When the plaintiff retired, the
defendant proposed that plaintiff sell his voting common stock to
members of the third generation. Plaintiff did so without negotiat-
ing over the price. Six years later, when the defendant retired and
sold his shares to his sons, he received a price that was more than
600% of what the plaintiff had received. Plaintiff sued, claiming
that he had trusted his brother and, therefore, had not negotiated
over price.
The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that because the
defendant, at the time of the sale of plaintiffs shares, was still
active in the business and more knowledgeable about the price of
the shares, he owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty. The court does
not reject the idea that special knowledge would create a duty.
Instead, it denied that the defendant had more information than
the plaintiff. Repeatedly it asserted that the plaintiff and defen-
dant had equal access to corporate information. 67
Camp v. Dema2 ' is another case involving the sale of shares of
a closely held corporation in which the court determines whether
266. 934 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1991).
267. See id. at 1407 ("Both plaintiff and defendant were corporate insiders, who had equal
access to information.... Plaintiff... held a position commensurate with that of defendant
and had equal access to all the relevant information. . . ."). See also id. at 1408 ("A fiduciary
relationship cannot be predicated on one party's allegedly superior knowledge of the facts
surrounding a transaction when the relevant facts are readily available to both parties.").
268. 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991).
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there is a relationship of trust and confidence between the defen-
dant and the plaintiff by looking at the information available to
each of them. Camp and Dema were both directors and emplbyees
of the firm. When matters deteriorated b tween them, Cqmp's
employment was terminated and he agreed t; sell back his shares.
While those negotiations were underway, De a began negotiations
with a third party to sell the firm. The sale f Camp's shares was
completed without Camp learning of the pos Iible sale of the firm.
Once Camp learned of the potential sale, he sued, naming another
director, Kidder, as an additional defendant. The court recognized
that in order to determine whether Kidder had breached a duty to
Camp in not disclosing the potential sale of the firm, it was
essential to identify the characteristics of Kidder's relationship to
Camp. Again, access to information served a crucial role. The court
found that Kidder's access to information was no greater than
Camp's, and thus one of the crucial factors in establishing a
fiduciary relationship was missing.269
The court's focus on relationship in Chiarella and Dirks did not
make equal access to information irrelevant. The questions of equal
access simply became part of the analysis of whether a fiduciary-
type relationship existed. Equality remains a crucial factor because
it is a fundamental component of the ideology of relations within
the market. We imagine markets in their paradigmatic form as
involving interactions among equals,27 ° and therefore we look for,
and find, these ideas of equality in cases involving trading on
security markets. When there is equality among the parties to a
transaction, the transaction fits easily within the norm for market
transactions. Where the parties are not equal, the transaction does
not fit our models and is easier to visualize as illegitimate.
The cases discussed above are "traditional" insider trading
cases - cases in which the insider has traded on information in
breach of a duty owed to the firm in whose shares he traded.2"' The
concept of relationship functions much the same in misappropri-
ation cases as in the traditional 10b-5 cases described above. The
misappropriation theory was developed primarily by the Second
Circuit after the Supreme Court's holding in Chiarella which found
that Chiarella had not violated Rule 10b-5, despite the fact that he
had traded with superior knowledge. 2 The theory originated to
269. See id. at 461.
270. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
271. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1997).
272. The misappropriation theory is usually traced to Justice Burger's dissenting opinion
in Chiarela. His concern was with the informational advantage that he believed one could
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prevent trading where there was unequal access to information.27
The misappropriation theory holds a defendant liable for trading on
information in breach of a duty to the source of that information.
It creates liability even in situations in which the trader owes no
duty to the company in whose shares he is trading.274 Under this
theory, a person in Chiarella's position would be held liable for
trading on the information received through the employer.275
Like the traditional insider trading case, the misappropriation
theory, as developed by the circuit courts, focuses on the insider's
obtain through the use of improper business practices. He recognized that as a general rule,
business people are encouraged to use their skill and experience to get ahead. But, this rule
should, he said, "give way when an informational advantage is obtained.., by some unlawful
means." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting). At
another point, he paraphrased the language of Cady, Roberts to argue that his ideas on the
misappropriation doctrine were derived from its imposition of insider trading liability on the
grounds of the "unfairness inherent in trading on... information when it is inaccessible to
those with whom one is dealing." Id. at 241. See also Jay G. Merwin Jr., Comment,
Misappropriation Theory Liability Awaits a Clear Signal, 51 BUS. LAW. 803 (1996) (stating
that the misappropriation theory is based on a need to respond to outsider trading after
Chiarella).
273. See, e.g., SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing the early
misappropriation cases as giving "legal effect to the commonsensical view that trading on the
basis of improperly obtained information is fundamentally unfair"); United States v.
Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing SEC v. Musella, 78 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the drafters
of securities laws envisioned an "open and honest market"). See also Ronald F. Kidd, Note,
Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory Versus an "Access to Information" Perspective,
18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 101 (1993) (arguing in favor of interpreting the misappropriation theory
as predicated on equal access to information).
In addition, the court in United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 621 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd
117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), rejected the misappropriation theory because it found it inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's opinions in Chiarella and Dirks. According to the Eighth Circuit's
decision in O'Hagan, "[Tihe courts which recognize the misappropriation theory seem to have
validated it on the basis of the assumed unfairness of allowing an individual to trade
securities on the basis of information which is not available to other traders." Id.
274. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2203-04. See also United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1981) (involving employees of an investment banking firm trading on information
about other firms obtained from their firm); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984)
(regarding an employee of a financial printer who traded on information about other firms);
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (regarding a Wall Street Journal
employee who traded on information about other firms).
The misappropriation theory, as derived from Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 244-45 (1980), focused on the "theft" of the information and
the need to disclose that theft to other traders. It was less concerned with a breach of duty
to the source of the information than the theory ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court
in O'Hagan.
275. See, e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding liable under the
misappropriation theory an employee of a financial printer who traded on information about
other firms).
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violation of a fiduciary duty or other similar relationship.276 Again,
one would think that the exploration of the idea of relationship
would be essential. As with the traditional insider trading cases,
however, courts do not investigate the predicate relationships in
any detail. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan pays
very little attention to what constitutes the necessary relationship,
although it reiterates the requirement for that relationship.277 The
Court variously describes the relationship as that of a "fiduciaryo
... in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality""27 and a "fidu-
ciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with
access to confidential information." '279 O'Hagan, himself, is merely
said to have breached a "duty of trust and confidence... owed to
his law firm."2 s° Had O'Hagan traded in shares of his law firm's
client, Grand Metropolitan, he could undoubtedly have been held
liable for insider trading under the Dirks footnote fourteen.28' The
Court in O'Hagan appears to take for granted that O'Hagan had the
necessary relationship to his source, however that relationship
might be described.
Other courts prior to O'Hagan had avoided having to delineate
the required relationship by implying that the rules of contract law
somehow govern the situation. Many misappropriation cases deal
with traders who obtained their information from their employers,
but who traded in shares of firms that were targets of the employ-
ers or of the employers' clients.282 In this type of setting, the
obligation not to trade on confidential, non-public information can
be grounded in the trader's employment contract. Courts need not
rely on or even describe a relationship between the source and the
trader in order to provide the basis for insider trading liability. For
example, in United States v. Carpenter, the court used an entire
276. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566-70 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the
importance of a fiduciary-type duty).
277. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2208.
281. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
282. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1987) (describing a trader who was
an attorney in a firm hired by a bidder and subsequently traded in shares of the target);
United States v: Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving co-conspirators who were
employed by investment banking firms and traded in the shares of companies that were
merger or takeover targets of their employers' clients); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.
1984) (concerning a trader who was employed by a financial printer whose clients were in the
process of acquiring the targets in which the defendant traded); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp.
425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (regarding a defendant, an employee of a law firm, who disclosed infor-
mation concerning targets of firm's clients to other defendants).
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paragraph to discuss the Wall Street Journal's confidentiality
policy.28 Under this policy, employees were required to treat new
market information learned by an employee through his or her
employment as nonpublic and not subject to disclosure. Although
the court in Carpenter sometimes referred to this duty as imposed
on the employee because of his or her status as an employee,284 at
other times, the source of the duty was the employee's contract and
negotiations with the employer.285 Similarly, in SEC v. Callahan,
the court emphasized that BusinessWeek, and its printer, Donnel-
ley, both had rules requiring the magazine's contents be kept confi-
dential.286 Although the complaint alleged a breach of a fiduciary
duty arising out of a relationship of trust or confidence, this was not
really the source of the duty. Instead, the duty is derived from the
employment agreement between the employer and the employees,
including the confidentiality rules.28 7 The employees had assumed
this obligation as part of their employment agreement.
Since the obligation was contractually based, the context was
clearly that of the market. If competition is not limited contractu-
ally, it is permitted and encouraged in the market, although the
competitive edge should be gained through "skill, foresight, [and]
industry.""28 In contrast, the "secreting, stealing, [or] purloining"
of information is prohibited.289 Within the family, "secreting,
stealing, [and] purloining" are also negative terms, but so is com-
petition in general. Thus, from Carpenter and Callahan, the basis
of the obligation that the trader owes to the information's source is
the trader's contractual, market-based connections to that source.
The objection is not to competition but, rather, to taking the
information in violation of an agreement not to do so. The trader is
prohibited from acting on his special information because he
283. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (2d Cir. 1986). See also United
States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1993) (detailing a description of the confi-
dentiality policy).
284. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028 n.5 (discussing the applicability of agency law).
285. See id. at 1031 (discussing the "employer-imposed" duty). See also United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 941 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the misappropriation theory, but
upholding a guilty verdict for mail fraud for violating the oath Bryan had signed upon
assuming office as director of West Virginia lottery).
286. See SEC v. Callahan, No. CV 90-0124, 1990 WL 180833, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 12,
1990).
287. See also SEC v. Gaspar, No. 83 Civ. 3037, 1985 WL 521, *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1985)
(finding that an employee owed a duty of confidentiality by virtue of employer's explicit
policies); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 n.26 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the absence of a
written confidentiality policy did not matter because the employee understood the policy).
288. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031.
289. Id.
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bargained away that advantage. In this setting, there is no conflict
between the principle of equality and the possibilty of unequal
information because the opportunity to trade on uniquely known
information was specifically relinquished upon assuming employ-
ment.
Most courts, however, do not explicitly name the employment
contract as the basis of the duty owed to the source. Frequently,
courts simply are not clear about the derivation of the duty. In
some cases, it appears to be grounded in the employee's obligations
as an agent for the employer. For example, in SEC v. Materia, the
court notes that an agent is under a duty not to use information
that he has acquired during the course of his agency.2 90 The court
treats this as if it were conclusive of the duty question, but it is not.
Materia did not simply use information that he obtained from his
employer, a financial printer. Like Chiarella, he had to add a large
measure of his own industry to this information in order to make it
profitable. Employees are allowed to have businesses on the side,
as long as those businesses do not compete with the employers'.2 9'
The court never discussed this issue, but simply assumed that
Materia had breached a duty owed by virtue of agency law.
In SEC v. Cherif, the court cited the same section of the Re-
statement (Second) of Agency that the Materia court had cited.292 It
found Cherif, a former employee, liable for divulging trade secrets.
However, Cherif s situation was distinguishable from that of most
employees who possess trade secrets becaise Cherif was not given
the confidential information during his employment, but rather
stole it after having been terminated from employment. The result
was that the court chose equality at the expense of efficiency, but
made this choice appear to have been required by the rules of
agency law.
In other cases, the courts rely more strongly on the idea of a
breach of "trust" between the employer and the employee when the
290. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 202 n.4 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359 (1958)).
291. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1958) (prohibiting competition as to
subject matter of agency, but not prohibiting agent from undertaking other forms of
business).
292. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411 (7th Cir. 1991). The court specifically rejected the
employment contract as a basis for liability. This is because Cherif was no longer employed
by the source of his information. He argued that the employment contract only prevented
him from using information so long as he remained employed. See id.
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employee trades on information obtained from the employer. 93
This "trust" does not create a relationship over which the parties
are likely to have bargained as they are the terms of employment
or agency. indeed, trust is a concept that is often not recognized in
the theoretical descriptions of the way market participants inter-
act.294 Instead, trust has an organic ring to it. The focus on "trust"
moves the basis of the duty outside of the market and toward the
realm of family relationships. The notion that employees may be in
non-contractually based relationships of trust and confidence vis-a-
vis their employers is used to mediate the inherent conflict between
the market principles of equality (of information) and efficiency
(through competition and the existence of informational inequali-
ties).
The misappropriation cases that ground the duty in the
agreement between the employer and the employee recognize that
trading on inside information may be permissible under certain cir-
cumstances.295 This would depend on the agreed upon contractual
terms. In contrast, the cases that find the duty to be based in a
relationship of trust that one party has reposed in the other do not
leave an opening for recognizing the legality of some insider trad-
ing. The misappropriation of the information is seen, "to put it
bluntly,' 29' as a theft of information,297 and theft is never accept-
able. As a result, this understanding of the misappropriation
293. In both United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981), and Materia, 745
F.2d at 201, the opinions claim that the traders "breached the trust and confidence placed
in them . . . ." See also Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412 ("Cherif betrayed a trust."). Courts often
combine these rationales, relying on some combination of employment contracts, agency, and
breaches of trust.
Both Newman and Materia also assert that the employers' reputations "as a safe
repository for client secrets" have been "sullied" as a result of the defendants' trading.
Newman, 664 F.2d at 17; Materia, 745 F.2d at 202. This type of language, that focuses on
the trust and confidence that the parties could have expected to have in one another and the
"sullying" of the employers' reputations, is reminiscent of the language that was used during
the heyday of separate spheres ideology for discussing a man's illicit sexual relationship with
a woman who was not his wife. In this way, misappropriation invokes images of women,
heterosexual relations, and of the violation of familial relationships.
294. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization, 36 J.L.
& EcON. 453 (1993). For a critique of this from a feminist perspective, see O'Neill, supra note
50.
295. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986) ('CThere are
disparities in knowledge and the availability thereof at many levels of market functioning
that the law does not presume to address."). Additionally, Rule 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act implies that insider trading can be legal so long as the trades are not "short
swing" trades.
296. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting).
297. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, J.,
dissenting)). See also Materia, 745 F.2d at 199 ("Materia stole information....").
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theory of insider trading is fundamentally at odds with Dirks and
Chiarella, which recognize the permissibility of some insider trad-
ing even if, as in Chiarella, one person's "trust" in another is there-
by violated.29
As long as the fact patterns stuck pretty closely to the patterns
of Chiarella, Newman, and Materia, they could be understood as
either contractually based or based in agency law with all of its
fiduciary aspects and trust connotations. Adding agency law to the
contractual basis of the cases added relatively little since contract
law was always available as an alternative explanation. Choosing
a basis for the prohibition on insider trading was not essential.
However, as the courts became faced with fact patterns that did not
involve employees using information that was obtained from their
employers, it became difficult to view the liability for trading as
derived from a contractual relationship. In these cases the courts
had to face more closely the question of how they should define
"relationship" in misappropriation cases.
This brings us once again to United States v. Chestman,299 and
its effort to determine whether the relationship between a husband
and wife is one of "trust and confidence." In Chestman, the court
articulated a series of rules for determining when such a relation-
ship exits. First, the relationship must be one in which one party
entrusts the other with confidences which are accepted as confi-
dences by the other. °" A confidential relationship cannot be unilat-
erally created. Second, whether a confidential relationship exists
turns to two crucial aspects of family relationships under separate
spheres ideology: interdependancy and domination.' 01 The Chest-
man court, in discussing confidential relationships, noted that an
important element is whether "[o]ne person depends on another -
298. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231-35.
299. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
300. See 947 F.2d at 567 (C[A] fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting
a person with confidential information."). See also United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685,
715 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted) ("As a general rule... a confidential relationship will
be found to exist only in situations in which it is shown that the confidence reposed by one
party was actually accepted by the other. The mere unilateral investment of confidence by
one party in the other ordinarily will not suffice to saddle the parties with the obligations and
duties of a confidential relationship.).
301. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing hierarchy as an essential
element of family).
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the fiduciary - to serve his interests.""3 2 A "fiduciary relationship
"3103involves discretionary authority and dependency ....
This means that when courts investigate the characteristics of
a fiduciary relationship in detail by focusing on domination and de-
pendency, they will end up discussing the same subject that they
were trying to excise from the discussion in Chiarella and Dirks.
"Equality" reenters the analysis under the guise of a lack of equal-
ity. If the court finds that the parties to the relationship are not
equal, then the court is one step closer to a finding of insider trad-
ing. As in traditional insider trading cases, the focus on relation-
ship returns us to a covert examination of equality. °4 It would be
just as unfair to allow those with inside information to trade on
that information if it were obtained as a result of non-market based
relations (relations of trust and confidence involving domination
and dependency) as it would if it were obtained in breach of a fidu-
ciary duty owed to the issuer of the shares.
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in O'Hagan30 ' does little
to alter this. James O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm which
represented a tender offeror. He traded in shares of the target.
The case decided the question of the legitimacy of the misappro-
priation theory, but it did not need to address the issue of what
counts as a "relationship of trust and confidence." Nevertheless,
the court's emphasis on O'Hagan's "deception of those who en-
.trusted him" with information reinvokes the idea of fairness.30 6
Here, "deception" is tied to fairness and to equal access to informa-
tion in two related ways. First, O'Hagan's conduct is characterized
as deceptive in that he did not disclose his trading to the source of
his information.0 7 Presumably, such disclosure would have had to
302. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569. See also Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 712 ("[A] confidential
relationship will be found to exist in those circumstances in which special confidence has
been reposed in one who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with
due regard to the interests of the one investing the confidence.").
303. Chestman, 947 F.2d. at 569. See also SEC'v. Downe, No. 92 Civ. 4092, 1993 WL
22126, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1993) (citing Chestman for the requirement that there must be
reliance, de facto control, and dominance in order to have the required relationship of trust
and confidence); SEC v. Mayhew, 916 F. Supp. 123, 130 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding no breach
of a fiduciary-like relationship between defendant and source of information whose
relationship was like "old boy networking" and did not involve control or dominance). Cf.
Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 713 (noting that one party's dominance over the other is not necessary
to find a confidential relationship).
304. Equality in this context is a significantly broader concept than the limited notion of
equal access to information that the Court rejected in Chiarella and Dirks.
305. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
306. 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
307. The Court specifically noted that the disclosure obligation runs to the source of the
information. It recognized that Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Chiarella, had
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occur prior to the trading, and would have had to receive the
source's consent. °8 Since both of these are very unlikely given the
confidential nature of the information involved, the "disclosure"
requirement actually ensures that trading will occur on a more level
informational playing field.
The second way that deception is tied to fairness and equal
access to information is in the Court's repeated stress on the goal
of the Securities and Exchange Act to secure "honest" markets. °9
Unlike the Court's opinions in Dirks and Chiarella, the O'Hagan
Court recognized that honesty in markets is tied to access to
information. While it studiously avoided the use of the term "equal
access," and while it recognized that "informational disparity is
inevitable in the securities markets,"31 it also identified as an evil
the fact that "investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital
in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law. '311 This is an acknowledgment of
the importance of ensuring a measure of equality in the access to
information. If the information is obtained as a result of a relation-
ship of "trust and confidence," it is particularly unlikely to be
accessible to others.
Thus, it may be that O'Hagan will begin the rehabilitation of
the equal access approach to insider trading. It may also begin the
process of re-masculinizing the ideal of equal access. Justice Gins-
burg, in her opinion in O'Hagan, ties the misappropriation theory
to the functioning of the market. Not only is the misappropriation
theory a legitimate interpretation of the Securities and Exchange
Act because it would make the markets fairer, it will also improve
their functioning. In the O'Hagan opinion, equality once again
becomes a characteristic of the market. If it is known that some
market traders have informational advantages that are due to the
deceptive misappropriation of information, others will be reluctant
to trade.3 12 Eliminating such advantages would bring the market
avocated an obligation that ran to those with whom the misappropriator was trading. This
broader obligation, however, was not in front of the Court in O'Hagan because the
government had not advocated that position. See id. at 2208 n.6.
308. The Court viewed the confidential information as "property," and its misappropriation
as similar to embezzlement. See id. at 2208. One who takes another's property embezzles
even if the taking is disclosed, although consent would probably be a defense. Thus,
disclosure alone should not be enough to legalize insider trading. Consent should be
necessary.
309. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
310. Id. at 2210.
311. Id.
312. See id. ("[]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where
trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.").
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closer to the ideal by increasing the role of research and skill in
market success.313 This would emphasize the autonomy and self-
reliance of traders.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion thus serves to reintegrate the values
of fairness and efficiency. Since Dirks, the Court has seen efficiency
as a component of a well functioning market. Justice Ginsburg
showed the role that fairness also plays in the market's functioning.
By tying fairness to the market's functioning, she reconnects it with
the male world. But O'Hagan was able to make this connection be-
cause it did not need to focus on the inside trader's relationship to
his source. That relationship was one that was not problematic in
the world of the market. Why should it matter to the source of the
information, however, if the relationship is market-based or not?
Either way, information gathered from a relationship of trust and
confidence without disclosure of the intent to trade, and without the
source's consent to that trade, will be "the fraudulent appropriation
to one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by
another."'314 This leaves the Court, after O'Hagan, at an important
crossroad. It can retain the relationship-based standard that the
lower courts had adopted for limiting the breadth of the insider
trading rule and for masking the conflict between the feminized
goal of fairness and the masculinized goal of efficiency. To do so
would be to undercut the fairness approach of O'Hagan. Or, the
Court can continue down the road begun in O'Hagan of trying to
integrate the goals of fairness and efficiency into one market. To do
this may require it to move beyond the traditional market/family
dichotomy.
V. CONCLUSION
Ideas about gender roles, the family, and the market are
important to the structure of insider trading law in multiple in-
terconnected ways. First, courts decide cases with reference to
these gender roles. Market participants are expected to behave in
stereotypically male ways. If it is unclear whether they have
actually acted as anticipated when we create assumptions that they
have, such as assuming that they act primarily for personal gain.
In deciding insider trading cases, courts are willing to make these
assumptions because they comport with the image of how men
should act in the market. In fact, courts rarely even recognize that
313. See id.
314. Id. at 2208.
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they have made any assumptions about motivation. These assum-
ptions not only affect the outcome of insider trading cases, they also
contain messages about how men are supposed to act in particular
situations.
Similarly, because we understand the male realm of markets
in opposition to the female realm of family, it would be anomalous
to apply insider trading law to situations that we see as familial
instead of as pertaining to the market. The result, as in Chest-
man,315 can be a rather tortured reading of past cases and present
facts, in an effort to conceive of the familial setting as outside of the
doctrinal requirements for liability under Rule 10b-5. Exactly
where we draw the line between market and family is not crucial.
Rather, what is important to keeping the two realms separate is
that there be a line.
A gender-conscious analysis is also important because it allows
us to identify issues in insider trading law that might otherwise
appear to have been resolved. For example, Dirks and Chiarella
appeared to have resolved the struggle between equal access and
efficiency norms in favor of efficiency and against equal access. A
focus on gender causes us to recognize that the idea of relationship
is usually tied to families, not markets with their autonomous
participants free of obligations to each other. "Relationship"
appears out of place as a crucial concept in insider trading law.316
A gender-conscious approach to insider trading law signals that the
misplaced concept should be investigated. Because of this, we are
driven to ask how "relationship" is defined. Does its definition
somehow redefine it in terms of the market instead of the family?
The study of relationship disclosed that the courts' concern was
primarily with questions of equal access to information, and that
this had been rearticulated as a determinant of "relationship" in
both traditional and misappropriation insider trading cases. A
gender-conscious analysis allows us to understand and expect this.
Equality is a characteristic associated with male-identified
markets, not with the family. It is part of our ideal of the market.
Banishing it entirely from the market would require an eventual
reconstruction of that ideal. Since that does not appear to be
happening, a gender-conscious analysis allows us to predict that the
norm of equality will reappear in insider trading analysis, but
perhaps under some other dress.
315. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
316. Cf. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER 2 (1966) (describing how dirt offends against
order).
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A gender-conscious analysis also allows us to predict that the
meaning of "relationship" will continue to be grounds for struggle
in insider trading law. O'Hagan, while somewhat reinstating the
importance of fairness in insider trading law, did relatively little to
define further the term "relationship." It left unresolved what the
law of insider trading will be in situations like United States v.
Bryan.317 In Bryan, the defendant traded on information that came
from his employer, the West Virginia Lottery. Bryan, decided prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan, rejected the misappro-
priation theory. Thus, it did not have to decide whether the
misappropriation theory applied to breaches of relationships with
those who were not in the market, or only to breaches of relation-
ships with market participants."' l The Supreme Court in O'Hagan
barely mentioned Bryan, leaving unresolved the question of how it
would have been decided. Similarly, its discussion of section 10b
mentioned Chestman only to note that several Circuit Courts of
Appeal had adopted the misappropriation theory.319
Thus, the question remains as to whether post-O'Hagan courts
will draw the lines as to what constitutes actionable insider trading
in the same place as the earlier courts had. A gender-conscious
analysis allows us to predict that wherever the line is drawn, the
determining factors will draw more on the question of access to
information, and less on the quality of the trader's relationship with
the source. The actual quality of the relationship cannot be in-
vestigated without delving into a series of emotional issues that are
likely to resonate as female-identified or connected to ideals of the
family. In contrast, focusing on the availability of information
implicates the norm of equality, which can be returned to its orig-
inal position as a male-identified market norm. This would make
it appropriate for consideration in a market context.
O'Hagan creates an opportunity to reexamine the direction of
insider trading law. We can continue along the old course, using
relationship as a defining aspect of whether there has been an
actionable breach of an insider's duty to disclose or abstain. This
is likely to lead to a hardening of the line between markets and
families, and a continued inability to talk openly about the role of
equal access to information in discussing insider trading cases.
317. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the misappropriation theory).
318. See Brief of Amici Curiae North American Securities Administrators Association and
Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)
(No. 96-842) (distinguishing trading in which the victim of the breach was not a market
participant).
319. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 n.3 (1997).
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Determinations of whether the required relationship exists would
then turn on questions of expected confidentiality or domination.
In the past, the former has served as a surrogate for a covert
investigation of the ready availability of the information to other
traders, while the latter has been mentioned and then ignored or
rejected. °
In contrast to this direction taken in the past, O'Hagan creates
the opportunity to begin a discussion of the role of equality of access
to information in the securities markets. Unlike the discussion
prior to O'Hagan, which focused on the availability of the informa-
tion to the insider and the individual with whom he traded, the
post-O'Hagan discussion can focus openly on access to information
as it affects outsiders' perceptions of fairness and their confidence
in the integrity of the market. Under this standard, Dirks is an
easy case. It is unlikely that market participants who do not pay
for a market analyst's advice would expect to be in as good a
position as those who do, even if the advice comes on subjects other
than those for which they have specifically paid. Chestman might
be just as easy a case for finding liability since, presumably, traders
would not have a lot of confidence in the market if the families of
insiders were able to trade on information not available to them.
Perhaps this is just a matter of asking what the outsider would
have to do to obtain the information. Legal payments do not seem
out of order while marrying for information does.
One important aspect of this analysis is that it would not draw
a firm line between family and market in the way that the
Chestman court did. An even more crucial aspect of the analysis,
however, is to remain conscious of the ways in which gender will
become reinscribed on any new decisional criteria if we are not
careful. For example, is differentiating between payment and
marriage as a means of gaining access to information just another
means of reiterating the market/family dichotomy? It will be hard
work to define what makes investors confident about markets
without recourse to this dichotomy.
Once we have overtly addressed the issue of equal access to
information, the trader's relationship with his source or employing
firm may no longer appear crucial. We may see it in its traditional
garb of a family-connected idea in the realm of the market. But,
perhaps the courts will believe that a violation of the norms of a
particular relationship is a means of obtaining unequal access to
320. See supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text (addressing the courts' discussion of
domination in Chestman and Reed).
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information. In that case, the nature of the relationship itself will
have to be investigated. This would be a revolutionary move in that
it would require the true investigation of a family-connected subject
in the realm of the market. It would immediately, but perhaps only
momentarily, destroy the border between markets and family. To
do this, we would need to ask questions about the details of the
relationship. Was Susan Loeb really dependent on Keith in finan-
cial matters? Would he be undermining her interests by trading?
What about the relationship between the father and son in Reed?
Is there any reason for these cases to come out differently? Sim-
ilarly, was the relationship between Ronald Secrist and Equity Fun-
ding one that was close enough to create an implied understanding
that there would be no disclosure of the information? Here again,
we need to be careful of how the dichotomy between market and
family influences our thinking. Are we quicker to understand the
relationship as barring disclosure or self-advancement when it is
familial than when it is a business relationship?
In sum, a gender conscious analysis would lead us to reconsider
our approach to both relationships and access to information in
deciding insider trading cases. In doing so, it would remind us that
we must continually challenge the reinscription of gender dichoto-
mies on the law.
Furthermore, constant interrogation would cause us, over time,
to alter aspects of the definitions of family and market, and with
them, aspects of the associated, prescribed gender roles. Insider
trading law, as we have seen, plays a part in restating the defini-
tion of family. Despite recent occasional- indications that the defin-
ition of family may be broadening elsewhere in the law,32' insider
trading law, like much of the rest of society, continues to define it
narrowly and to premise it on a heterosexual marriage.322 In this
way, insider trading law plays a role in reinscribing a conservative
social definition of family. This function of insider trading law is
321. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (defining 'Tamily" in rent
control laws as including unmarried lifetime partners, not just those connected by blood or
law); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (requiring the state to show compelling state
interest for limiting marriage statute to heterosexuals); Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw.
Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996) (finding that the state had failed to demonstrate a compelling state
interest).
322. The furor created by Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), is an indication of how
important the idea of heterosexual marriage remains to this society's definition of family.
See also 28 U.S.C.A. 1738C (relieving states of full faith and credit obligation as to same sex
marriages); 1 U.S.C.A. 7 (defining marriage for Acts of Congress or federal regulations as the
"legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife ....").
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largely unrecognized, because in the absence of a gender conscious
analysis of insider trading, it is invisible.
Thus, markets and families are intricately connected. Defining
one defines the other. Insider trading law today is premised on
retaining the difference between markets and families, men and
women. As gender roles are redefined over time, insider trading
law can also be expected to change. It is both defined by gender
categories and has a part in defining those categories. As a result,
it is unlikely that the courts will ever articulate a stable definition
of insider trading. Conscious attention to the influence of gender,
however, will allow courts to recognize that influence for what it is,
and to reformulate doctrine so as to question the effects of arbitrary
gender stereotypes. In doing so, courts dealing with questions
about insider trading will necessarily be reformulating our most
intimate notions about family and familial relationships.
